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ON THE DANGER OF WEARING TWO HATS: MISTRETTA
AND MORRISON REVISITED
RONALD J. KROTOSZYNSKI, JR.*

[Tihe Constitution, at least as a per se matter, does not forbid
judges to wear two hats; it merely forbids them to wear both
hats at the same time.1
More than any other separation of powers/delegation doctrine
decisions, Mistretta v. United States2 and Morrison v. Olson'
broadly endorsed the functionalist vision4 of the modern admin-

* Assistant Professor of Law, Indiana University, Indianapolis. J.D., LL.M., Duke
University; BA, M.A., Emory University. I wish to thank Professors S. Elizabeth
Wilborn, Christopher H. Schroeder, Roy M. Mersky, and soon-to-be Professor E. Gary
Spitko for their invaluable assistance with this Article. I would also like to acknowledge the assistance of Nancy M. Olson, John C. Hueston, and Randall D. Lehner,
who were all instrumental in the development of this piece. As always, any errors
or omissions are my responsibility alone.
1. Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 404 (1989).
2. 488 U.S. 361 (1989).
3. 487 U.S. 654 (1988).
4. Functionalism and formalism are the two principal competing theories of the
separation of powers doctrine. Functionalism focuses on the substantive policy goals
that a particular assignment of responsibilities seeks to aichieve or advance and provides that as long as a given scheme does not reassign one of the core functions of
a coordinate branch, the arrangement should be permitted. See Cass R. Sunstein,
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istrative state. In both Mistretta and Morrison, the Supreme
Court assumed that the service of federal judges in quasi-legisla5 and quasi-executive (Morrison)
6 roles would not
tive (Mistretta)
undermine the integrity of the Article III courts. Subsequent
developments suggest that the Supreme Court significantly underestimated the corrosive impact of permitting federal judges to
discharge consecutively (if not concurrently) judicial, legislative,
and executive functions.
Operational difficulties associated with the independent counsel provisions of the Ethics in Government Act7 and the Sen-

Constitutionalism After the New Deal, 101 HARV. L. REV. 421, 495-96 (1987). Congress and the federal courts have erected the modem administrative state on a functionalist basis. See CHRISTOPHER F. EDLEY, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: RETHINKING
JUDICIAL CONTROL OF BUREAUCRACY 4-5 (1990). Mistretta and Morrison provide excellent examples of functionalist reasoning in action. See Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 371412; Morrison, 487 U.S. at 677-85. Formalism emphasizes the structural separation
of powers reflected in the division of legislative, executive, and judicial power in Articles I, II, and III of the Constitution. See Martin H. Redish & Elizabeth J. Cisar,
'If Angels Were to Govern".• The Need for Pragmatic Formalism in Separation of
Powers Theory, 41 DUKE L.J. 449, 455 n.34 (1991). Formalists believe that the text
of the Constitution and the intent of the Framers concerning the proper relationship
of the branches (to the extent that their intent can be determined) should control
separation of powers analyses. See Sunstein, supra, at 493; see also Redish & Cisar,
supra, at 449-56. INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 944-59 (1983), exemplifies formalist
reasoning.
Professor Sunstein offers a third model for analyzing separation of powers questions, the Holmesian view, under which each branch of government must defend its
own institutional prerogatives. See Sunstein, supra, at 494-95. Under this approach,
the federal courts would not play a significant role in resolving executive/legislative
interbranch disputes; rather, the courts would use various decision-avoidance techniques, i.e., the political question doctrine, and permit the political branches to resolve their own differences. See id. at 495. For additional views on the formalism/functionalism dichotomy, see Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 115 S. Ct. 1447,
1453-57 (1995), which describes various theories of the separation of powers and asserts that the separation of powers precludes both Congress and administrative
agencies from altering by statute federal courts' final judgments; Harold J. Krent,
Separating the Strands in Separation of Powers Controversies, 74 VA. L. REV. 1253,
1254-55 (1988), which describes generally the functionalist/formalist debate; and Peter L. Strauss, Formal and Functional Approaches to Separation-of-Powers Questions-A Foolish Inconsistency?, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 488, 492-96 (1987), which describes and discusses formalism and functionalism and argues in favor of
functionalism.
5. See Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 395-96.
6. See Morrison, 487 U.S. at 695.
7. 28 U.S.C. §§ 591-599 (1994).
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tencing Reform Act (SRA)8 have disproved crucial assumptions
that underlie the Court's decisions in Mistretta and Morrison. In
the case of the United States Sentencing Commission ("Sentencing Commission"), federal judges serving as Sentencing Commissioners have refused to recuse themselves both in cases challenging the legality of particular guidelines and in cases challenging the entire system of sentencing guidelines.'
John Locke observed that nothing is more fundamentally unfair than a person serving as a judge in his own case.'0 Wearing the hat of "Sentencing Commissioner," federal judges serve
as legislators, drafting sentencing rules." Afterwards, wearing
the hat of "Article III judge," they pass upon the legality of their
own work product. 2 In reality, judges who serve as Sentencing
Commissioners are refusing to recuse themselves in cases involving their own work product'--Locke's objection notwithstanding. Although it is doubtful that the Mistretta decision anticipated such a state of affairs, its real-world effects are to the
contrary.
Similarly, recent events have cast serious doubts on the validity of Morrison's assumption that federal judges could appoint
independent counsels without compromising the political independence-and hence credibility-of the Article III courts. Judges serving on the Special Division, which is charged with appointing independent counsels, have become deeply embroiled in
what are essentially political disputes. 4 This is an incredible

8. Id. §§ 991-998.
9. See, e.g., United States v. McLellan, 28 F.3d 117 (11th Cir. 1994) (unpublished
opinion) (vacating an inmate's sentence because the sentencing judge was a member
of United States Sentencing Commission); see also United States v. Wright, 873 F.2d
437, 445-47 (1st Cir. 1989) (Breyer, J., writing separately) (discussing his decision
not to recuse himself despite being a member of the Sentencing Commission).
10. See John Locke, The Second Treatise of Government §§ 13, 87-91, 125, in TWo
TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 293-94, 341-44, 369 (P. Laslett ed., 1960). Indeed, Locke
posited that individuals leave the state of nature, forming a commonwealth, inter
alia, precisely to avoid having individuals serve as judges in cases in which they are
interested. See id. § 88, at 342-43.
11. See 28 U.S.C. § 991.
12. See Wright, 873 F.2d at 445-47 (Breyer, J., writing separately).
13. See id. (Breyer, J., writing separately).
14. See, e.g., Judges Err on Whitewater, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 9, 1994, at A26; Susan
Schmidt, Former ABA Presidents Criticize Panel That Chose Starr, WASH. POST,
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turn of events, given the bulwark Article III erects to protect
federal judges from such influences. 5 Indeed, most federal
judges abandon all partisan activity upon being named to the
bench. 6
Against this backdrop, the decision made by a judge of the
United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia to
meet with two highly partisan Republican senators, apparently
to discuss (among other things) the appointment of an independent counsel in the Whitewater affair, 7 simply is inappropriate. When outraged members of the public filed formal ethics

Sept. 27, 1994, at A9; Howard Schneider, Judge Met Sen. FairclothBefore Fiske Was
Ousted, WASH. POST, Aug. 12, 1994, at A21. Moreover, the political controversy associated with the appointment of Ken Starr as the Whitewater independent counsel
has not proven to be an isolated event. See In re Charge of Judicial Misconduct or
Disability, 85 F.3d 701 (D.C. Cir. Judicial Council 1996) (describing and dismissing
citizen complaints regarding a senator's alleged attempt to influence the selection of
the independent counsel appointed to investigate now-deceased Commerce Secretary
Ron Brown by lobbying the Chief Judge of the Special Division).
15. "The Judges, both of the supreme and inferior Courts, shall hold their Offices
during good Behaviour, and shall, at stated Times, receive for their Services a Compensation, which shall not be diminished during their Continuance in Office." U.S.
CONST. art. III, § 1. The Framers provided federal judges with life tenure and
constitutionalized the sanctity of their paychecks precisely to protect the independence of the federal judiciary. See Chisom v. Roemer, 501 U.S. 380, 400 (1991). Indeed, independence and its resulting impartiality help to secure the public's trust in
the work product of the federal judiciary; i.e., they facilitate public acceptance of its
decisions. If Congress may direct federal judges to participate in a process that necessarily involves conducting ex parte meetings with highly ideological legislators in the
Senate dining room, then Article III's protections will do little to preserve the public's
perception of the integrity of Article III judges. Cf In re Charge of Judicial Misconduct or Disability, 39 F.3d 374, 379 (D.C. Cir. Judicial Council) (holding that Special
Division judge's ex parte communications with two United States Senators while the
Special Division was considering the appointment of an independent counsel to investigate the Whitewater affair did not constitute "prejudicial effect on the administration of the business of the courts"), affd, Nos. 94-8 & 94-9 (D.C. Cir. Dec. 30, 1994).
16. In fact, some judges even cease to vote. Justice John Marshall Harlan, for
example, refused to vote or participate in any electoral activities whatsoever because
he believed that such activities undermined the public's confidence in the impartiality of Article III judges. See Nathan Lewin, John Marshall Harlan; in THE SUPREME
COURT JUSTICES: ILLUSTRATED BIOGRAPHIES, 1798-1993, at 445 (C. Cushman ed.,
1993). For similar reasons, Justice Harlan also refused to attend the President's annual State of the Union Address. See id. To this day, the Justices attending the
State of Union Address neither stand nor applaud during the President's speech.
See, e.g., The State of the Union Address (NBC television broadcast, Feb. 4, 1997).
17. See Chargeof JudicialMisconduct, 39 F.3d at 375; Schneider, supranote 14, at A21.
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complaints protesting the judge's behavior, however, the Chief
Judge of the D.C. Circuit not only defended his colleague's behavior, but embraced it openly."8 The Chief Judge's decision
later was affirmed by the Judicial Council of the District of Columbia Circuit by a vote of eight to two. 9 If service on the Special Division means that Article III judges must participate in
essentially political disputes, then, Morrison notwithstanding,
the independent counsel provisions of the Ethics in Government
Act cannot be constitutional.
The Supreme Court has failed to appreciate the fragility of
the Article III courts in our system of democratic government by
rushing to show its openness to the new administrative state, in
which the blending of executive, legislative, and judicial functions is to be appreciated as a necessary, if not tasty, constitutional jambalaya. ° A fundamental difference exists between
congressional schemes that redistribute the division of political
power between the politically-accountable executive and legislative branches and programs that attempt to place such power in
the hands of electorally unaccountable federal judges.2 '
Simply put, a scheme that vests unelected judges with powers
and responsibilities that the Constitution delegates to the executive or legislative branches will create a corresponding public
demand for political accountability in the exercise of these delegated functions. The net effect of such arrangements is not difficult to predict: the public's confidence in the nonpartisan nature
of the Article III courts will be undermined and ultimately destroyed; independent, nonpartisan, "neutral" judges are essential
18. See Charge of Judicial Misconduct, 39 F.3d at 382 (suggesting the necessity of
such communication); infra notes 206-22 and accompanying text.
19. See Charge of Judicial Misconduct, Nos. 94-8 & 94-9; see also Charge of Judicial Misconduct, 85 F.3d 701 (endorsing the application of Judge Edwards's identical
reasoning in a subsequent case raising similar issues).
20. See ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 16-33 (1962) (discussing the countermajoritarian difficulty arising when the Court overrules legislative
acts); see also JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUSr. A THEORY OF JUDICIAL
REVIEW 4-9, 41, 44-72 (1980) (warning that the Court should not attempt to impose
its own views and values on society through its decisions lest it lose its popular legitimacy); Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73
HARV. L. REV. 1, 2-10 (1959) (calling for the adoption of consistent and principled
decision making by the Court).
21. See infra Part IV.C.
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to the legitimacy of the Article III courts.2 2
Part I of this Article discusses the Supreme Court's opinion in
Mistretta and its aftermath in the lower courts. Part I gives particular attention to the failure of Sentencing Commissioners/judges to recuse themselves in cases involving direct challenges to the legality of the United States Sentencing
Commission's work product. Part II reviews the Morrison opinion and describes the real-world effects of requiring federal judges to undertake an essentially political task. Part III examines
historical counterexamples of judges undertaking extrajudicial
service in the executive branch of government. Finally, Part IV
offers an agenda for positive reform and takes up the broader
policy concerns that necessitate reform. Significantly, Part IV
argues that an element of formalism should be deemed essential
in all separation of powers analyses that involve delegations of
political authority to either Article III courts or Article III
judges.
The exigencies of the modern administrative state cannot be
permitted to justify radical departures from the Framers' libertyenhancing scheme of separated and divided powers. If formalism
truly is dead (Justice Scalia's protestations notwithstanding),'
Congress is free to task Article III judges with extrajudicial (i.e.,
nonjudicial) duties. The Supreme Court, however, must require
Congress to structure these delegations in a manner that avoids
doing violence to the credibility and legitimacy of the judicial
branch. Unlike the executive and legislative branches of the federal government, the judiciary is not politically accountable to
the electorate.24 Accordingly, the federal courts should treat
novel power sharing arrangements that involve transfers of
executive or legislative responsibilities to the judiciary with
greater skepticism than they treat delegations of authority between the politically accountable branches.25 Because Mistretta
and Morrison have failed to protect adequately the institutional
integrity of the Article III courts, the Supreme Court must adopt
22. See infra Part IV.C and text accompanying notes 175-82.

23. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., The New Textualism, 37 UCLA L. REV. 621,
650-56 (1990) (describing Justice Scalia's formalism).
24. See infra text accompanying note 341.
25. See infra text accompanying notes 336-45.
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more detailed rules to govern the participation of judges in extrajudicial undertakings. If federal judges are to wear two hats
(or more), these new accoutrements must not clash with their
old wardrobes.
I. MISTRETTA: WHO WILL JUDGE THE JUDGES?

A. A BriefReview of the Mistretta Holding
In 1984, Congress created the United States Sentencing Commission under the auspices of the SRA. 5 The SRA established
the Sentencing Commission to oversee the reform of federal sentencing policy; its objective was to "review and revise" federal
sentencing policy." Incident to this duty, the Sentencing Commission would consult with authorities on the federal sentencing
system.' Ultimately, Congress charged the Sentencing Commission with developing and maintaining a comprehensive system of guidelines that would govern federal district judges' sentencing decisions.2 9 Mistretta presented a facial challenge to the
constitutionality of the United States Sentencing Commission."
The Sentencing Commission was itself somewhat unique; unlike most independent federal commissions, Congress placed the
Sentencing Commission "[with]in the judicial branch of the
United States.""' Notwithstanding Congress's placement of the

26. Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1987 (1984)
(codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 3551-3586 (1994) & 28 U.S.C. §§ 991-998
(1994)). For a brief historical account of the reasons why Congress passed the Sentencing Reform Act, see Rnald F. Wright, Sentencers, Bureaucrats, and the Administrative Law Perspective on the Federal Sentencing Commission, 79 CAL. L. REV. 1, 8-

12 (1991).
27. See 28 U.S.C. § 994(o).
28. See id.
29. See id. § 994(a).
30. Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 371 (1989).
31. 28 U.S.C. § 991(a) For reasons that are unclear at best, the Supreme Court
acquiesced in this characterization. See Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 384-97. Regardless of
the constitutionality of having active federal judges serve as lawgivers, it takes a
great leap of constitutional logic to locate an independent commission within Article
III. Perhaps such an institution could be located within the executive branch, as a
kind of executive department. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl.1. By way of contrast,
Article III speaks only to "courts": "The judicial power of the United States shall be
vested in one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from
time to time ordain and establish." Id. art. III, § 1.
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Sentencing Commission within the judicial branch, it vested the
President with the power to appoint, each of the Commission's
seven members. 32 The SRA also required that no fewer than
three of the Sentencing Commissioners be federal judges selected from a nomination list consisting of six judges submitted by
the Judicial Conference of the United States. 3
The facts of Mistretta were fairly simple. John M. Mistretta
had pled guilty to a single count of conspiracy related to the sale
and distribution of cocaine.' At his sentencing, after rejecting
arguments regarding the legality of the sentencing guidelines,35
the district court applied these guidelines and sentenced
Mistretta to eighteen months of imprisonment, to be followed by
a three-year period of supervised release.3 "
Mistretta's challenge to the constitutionality of the Sentencing
Commission eventually found its way to the Supreme Court. 7
Before the Court, Mistretta argued that the Sentencing Commission was unconstitutional because the SRA unlawfully delegated
legislative authority to an independent commission." Mistretta
also argued that the composition of the Sentencing Commission
violated separation of powers principles.39 This separation of
powers argument had three components. First, Mistretta argued
that Congress could not locate the Sentencing Commission within the judicial branch of government;" second, Mistretta
claimed that the composition of the Sentencing Commission, i.e.,
the -inclusion of federal judges, was constitutionally problematic;4 ' and, third and finally, Mistretta claimed that the
President's authority to appoint and remove Sentencing Commissioners impermissibly vested control of a judicial entity within the executive branch.42

32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.

See
See
See
See
See
See
See
See
See
See
See

28 U.S.C. § 991(a).
id.
Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 370.
id. at 370-71.
id. at 371.
id.
id.
id. at 380.
id. at 383-84.
id. at 384, 397.
id. at 384, 408-09.
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Writing for an eight to one majority, Justice Blackmun rejected the delegation challenge, noting that "we harbor no doubt that
Congress'[s] delegation of authority to the Sentencing Commission is sufficiently specific and detailed to meet constitutional
requirements."4 3 The Court's treatment of the delegation question simply confirmed what administrative law scholars have
suspected for quite some time: the delegation doctrine is dead."
Turning to the separation of powers arguments, the Court
identified two general kinds of separation of powers problems.
First, neither Congress nor the President may assign to the judiciary duties that "more properly" could be accomplished by one
of the other branches.4 5 Second, the Court identified a corresponding principle that Article III judges cannot assume duties
that threaten the "institutional integrity" of the judicial
branch." Acknowledging that the SRA's scheme for judicial
participation in sentencing "give[s] rise to serious concerns about
a disruption of the appropriate balance of governmental power
among the coordinate branches,"4 7 the Court nevertheless concluded that Mistretta's concerns were "more smoke than fire."48
Surprisingly, the Court expressly sanctioned Congress's decision to locate the Sentencing Commission within the judicial
branch of government.49 "In light of... precedent and practice,

43. Id. at 374.
44. Leading administrative law scholars have been making this claim for almost
40 years. See, e.g., KENNETH CULP DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE 75-76 (1st

ed. 1958) (stating that the nondelegation doctrine is "without practical force"). This
view continues to enjoy broad support both within the legal academy and among
members of the federal judiciary. See PETER L. STRAUSS, AN INTRODUCTION TO ADMNISTRATIVE JUSTICE IN THE UNITED STATES 20 (1989); Peter H. Aranson et al., A
Theory of Legislative Delegation, 68 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 5, 7-17 (1982); David
Schoenbrod, The Delegation Doctrine: Could the Court Give It Substance?, 83 MICH.
L. REV. 1223, 1233-34 (1985); J. Skelly Wright, Beyond Discretionary Justice, 81
YALE L.J. 575, 582 (1972). A number of proposals for reinvigorating the doctrine,
however, also have been offered. See, e.g., Aranson et al., supra, at 17, 63-67;
Schoenbrod, supra, at 1236-37.
45. See Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 383 (quoting Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 659, 68081 (1988)).
46. See id. (quoting Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833,
851 (1986)).
47. Id. at 384.
48. Id.
49. See id. at 384-85, 390.
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we can discern no separation-of-powers impediment to the placement of the Sentencing Commission within the judicial
branch."" Moreover, the Court noted that the:
'[P]ractical consequences' of locating the Commission within
the Judicial Branch pose no threat of undermining the integrity of the Judicial Branch or of expanding the powers of the
Judiciary beyond constitutional bounds by uniting within the
Branch the political or quasi-legislative power of the Commission with the judicial power of the courts.5 '
The Court reasoned that because the Sentencing Commission
does not purport to be a court, there is no separation of powers
difficulty arising from its placement within the judicial
branch.52 It also emphasized the "nonpolitical" nature of the
Commission's work.53
Although it may be possible to "locate" certain administrative
functions annexed to the business of judging within Article III, it
is difficult to fathom exactly how the determination of sentencing ranges is an appropriate Article III task any more than, for
example, the determination of federal telecommunications policy
would be. Could Congress locate the Federal Communications
Commission within the Article III courts rather than within the
executive branch? In a manner much like a recent college graduate moving into a new apartment and directing the placement of
an old sofa, the Mistretta majority basically told the Congress to

50. Id. at 390.
51. Id. at 393. See also THE FEDERALIST NO. 47, at 376 (James Madison) (John C.
Hamilton ed., 1866) (describing the dangers of joining legislative and judicial power,
and quoting Montesquieu); id. No. 78, at 576 (Alexander Hamilton) (asserting that
the liberty of the people is endangered when the judiciary ceases to be distinct from
the legislature); Locke, supra note 10, § 13, at 293 (observing the fundamental unfairness of a person serving as judge in his own case).
52. See Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 393-94.
53. See id. at 396. Recent events suggest that this characterization may be grossly
inaccurate. Certainly, the guidelines applicable to convictions for the sale of crack cocaine, which are appreciably more harsh than those applicable to the sale of powder
cocaine, have given rise to substantial dissatisfaction on the part of many Americans. See Ari Armstrong, Crack Cocaine: Make the Sentencing Fair, WASH. POST,
Aug. 15, 1995, at A17; Cocaine Injustice, N.Y. TIMES, May 31, 1994, at A16; President Clinton and Crack, WASH. POST, Nov. 2, 1995, at A30.
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"put it anywhere."' 4
The Mistretta decision also addressed whether the composition
of the Sentencing Commission presented constitutional difficulties. Citing to historical examples of joint executive/judicial
branch appointments,55 the majority concluded that "the Founders themselves" believed that "the constitutional principle of separation of powers does not absolutely prohibit extrajudicial service."5" The Court overlooked, however, that all of these prior
joint appointments were executive in nature; none of them involved performing duties of an essentially legislative nature.57
Nevertheless, the Court embraced the analogy to prior joint
executive/judicial appointments stating: "Such power as these
judges wield as Commissioners is not judicial power; it is administrative power derived from the enabling legislation."58 In any
54. Some scholarly criticism of this part of the majority's holding has been particularly harsh. See, e.g., Steven G. Calabresi & Joan L. Larsen, One Person, One Offlice: Separation of Powers or Separation of Personnel?, 79 CoRNELL L. REV. 1045,
1138 (1994) ("The majority of the Court, idiotically concluding that the Commission
was an Article III entity, allowed dual service in this instance.").
55. The Court specifically cited John Jay's dual service as Chief Justice and as
Ambassador to England, Oliver Ellsworth's joint service as Chief Justice and as minister to France, and John Marshall's joint service as Chief Justice and as Secretary
of State. See Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 398-99. The Court failed to cite the more recent
precedent set by Justice Abe Fortas, who attempted (unsuccessfully) to execute both
the duties of Associate Justice and presidential advisor. See infra text accompanying
notes 281-84.
56. Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 399. The majority failed to mention that such service
was always highly controversial and tended to detract from the credibility of the
Court. See infra Part HI.B.1.
57. Indeed, if one characterizes the work of the Sentencing Commission as being
"legislative" in nature, a joint appointment as a Sentencing Commissioner/judge runs
up against the spirit, though not the letter, of the prohibition against legislators
holding joint appointments in the executive or judicial branch. See U.S. CONST. art.
I, § 6, cl. 2 ("[N]o Person holding any Office under the United States, shall be a
Member of either House during his Continuance in Office.").
58. Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 404. Of course, if the power exercised by the Sentencing
Commission is not judicial power, one might seriously question how the Commission
can be "located" in the judicial branch of government. After all, Article III plainly
states only that "ft]he judicial Power" is "vested in one supreme Court, and in such
inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish." U.S.
CONST. art. III, § 1. As Justice Scalia noted in his dissent from Mistretta, if the
Commission is exercising executive power, it is a creature of Article II; if legislative
power, then a creature of Article I. See Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 422-23 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting). Justice Scalia's principal complaint, however, focused on the creation of a
'Jjunior varsity Congress" and the (in his view) illegitimate creation of an indepen-
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event, the Court held that this judicial-but-not-really-judicialservice was constitutionally unobjectionable on its face. 9
The Court cautioned, however, that if a particular extrajudicial assignment "undermines the integrity of the judicial
branch," judicial personnel could not undertake such an assignment.6" This caveat apparently did not apply to the Sentencing
Commission: "[W]e cannot see how the service of federal judges
on the Commission will have a constitutionally significant practical effect on the operation of the judicial branch."6 ' Acknowledging that "[tihe legitimacy of the Judicial Branch ultimately
depends on its reputation for impartiality and nonpartisanship,"
the Court concluded that service on the Sentencing Commission
would not bring the judiciary into disrepute.62 "That federal
judges participate in the promulgation of guidelines does not
affect their or other judges' ability impartially to adjudicate sentencing issues.'"
The Court did not consider, and therefore did not address,
whether Sentencing Commissioners would consider the legality
of their own work product. Such a course of action would
conflate legislative power with the judiciary's power of review,
denying the litigant before the reviewing (or sentencing) court
the benefit of the separation of powers." Perhaps the majority
simply assumed that Sentencing Commissioners would recuse
themselves in cases involving challenges to the guidelines." In
dent, administrative "fourth branch" of the federal government, rather than on the
propriety of judicial service in such a fourth branch. See id. at 427 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
59. See id. at 374.
60. See id. at 404 & n.27.
61. Id. at 406.
62. Id. at 407.
63. Id. at 406-07.
64. See Rebecca L. Brown, Separated Powers and Ordered Liberty, 139 U. PA. L.
REV. 1513 (1991) (asserting that the separation of powers represents a countermajoritarian protection of an individual's rights against unfair treatment by the
government).
65. The Court noted that it saw "no reason why service on the Commission should
result in widespread judicial recusals." See Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 406. This suggests
that the Court did foresee a need for isolated judicial recusals, i.e., that individual
Sentencing Commissioners might have to recuse themselves in a nontrivial number
of sentencing disputes. Although the common law rule of necessity might require the
Supreme Court to pass on the ultimate merits of a challenge to the Federal Rules of
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any event, the practice of Sentencing Commissioners/judges suggests that the Court needed to address this issue with greater

clarity.
B. The Aftermath: Failing To Observe Locke's Admonition That
No Man Should Be a Judge in His Own Case
In his Two Treatises of Government, John Locke posited that
one of the principal reasons that people leave the state of na-

ture, forming political societies, is to avoid the evils of having
individuals serve as judges in their own cases." He explained

that:
I desire to know what kind of government that is, and how
much better it is than the State of Nature, where one Man
commanding a multitude, has the Liberty to be Judge in his
own Case, and may do to all his Subjects whatever he pleases, without the least liberty to any one to question or controle
those who Execute his Pleasure? And in whatsoever he doth,
whether led by Reason, Mistake, or Passion, must be submitted to? Much better it is in the State of Nature wherein Men
are not bound to submit to the unjust will of another: And if
he that judges, judges amiss in his own, or any other Case,
he is answerable for it to the rest of Mankind.67

Evidence or the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, no such necessity exists for the
participation of Sentencing Commissioners from the lower federal courts. Cf. United
States v. Will, 449 U.S. 200, 217 (1980) (ruling that the public interest would not be
served by requiring that all judges disqualify themselves from hearing cases challenging the validity of a statute freezing judicial compensation on conflict of interest
grounds if such disqualification would deny litigants a proper forum); see also Mississippi Publ'g Corp. v. Murphree, 326 U.S. 438, 445 (1946) (holding that the federal
courts could undertake principal responsibility for drafting and maintaining the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure even if such rules have "incidental" effects on litigants'
substantive rights).
66. Locke, supra note 10, § 13, at 293.
67. Id. John Locke's influence on the founding generation was both profound and
pervasive. See BERNARD BAILYN, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 26-30 (1967). It is therefore particularly appropriate to rely upon Locke to
develop an understanding of the theoretical foundations of the separation of powers
doctrine. See generally Letter from Thomas Jefferson to John Trumbull (Feb. 15,
1798), in THE PORTABLE THOMAS JEFFERSON 434-35 (Merrill D. Peterson ed., 1975)
("I will put off till my return from America [the purchase of certain busts and portraits] except Bacon, Locke and Newton . . . as I consider them as the three greatest men that have ever lived, without any exception . .

").
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Thus, according to Locke, living under a government without
independent and impartial judges actually is worse than living
in the state of nature."
In Locke's view, any system of government that does not provide for a neutral adjudicator to resolve disputes leaves the nominal citizens in the state of nature.69 An independent and impartial judiciary is essential to the creation and maintenance of
a civil society because impartial judges provide a necessary
check on the unrestrained exercise of power by executive or
legislative officers."0 Thus, it is imperative for civil governments to provide the citizenry with "known and indifferent"
judges who possess the "[a]uthority to determine all differences
according to the established Law."7
The idea that no person should be both lawmaker and judge
also constitutes a component of "natural justice," which to this
day remains an element of Anglo-American law.72 At a theoretical level, the separation of powers doctrine both reflects and implements this basic principle."
Locke's theoretical justification for the separation of powers
and practical concerns about the neutrality of judges remain
quite relevant today.74 The American public expects federal
judges to be neutral: capable of deciding matters that come before them free of financial interest or political or ideological
prejudgments." Locke's theories help to explain more concrete68. See Locke, supra note 10, § 87, at 341-42. Locke goes on to explain that the
protection of property requires individuals to form civil societies, one of the chief
benefits of which will be the rule of law. See id.
69. See id. § 90, at 344.
70. See id. § 91, at 344-45.
71. Id. § 125, at 369 (emphasis omitted); see also id. § 131, at 371 (calling for the
provision of "indifferent and upright Judges").
72. See STRAUSS, supra note 44, at 14.
73. See id.; see also Brown, supra note 64, at 1531-40 (discussing the relationship
between the concept of ordered liberty and separation of powers theory); Peter L.
Strauss, The Place of Agencies in Government: Separation of Powers and the Fourth
Branch, 84 COLUM. L. REv. 573, 622 (1984) (discussing the role of considerations of
individual fairness in separation of powers theory).
74. See generally STRAUSS, supra note 44, at 17-18 (suggesting that recent challenges to congressional grants of executive and judicial powers to legislative agents
reflected "a continued vitality for separation of powers ideas"); see, e.g., Bowsher v.
Synar, 478 U.S. 714 (1986); INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983).
75. See 28 U.S.C. § 455(a), (b) (1988). As one federal judge has explained:
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ly why the citizenry holds these baseline assumptions; his theories also predict the consequences if the judiciary should fail to
meet them-a fundamental lack of faith in the civil government. 6
Ultimately, one should not find the American public's expectation that judges will be independent and nonpartisan particularly surprising, given that the United States maintains an adversarial system of justice in which attorneys do their best to
press their clients' cases successfully before both juries and
judges.77 In this system, judges serve as the umpires, and routinely are called upon to decide myriad procedural and substantive questions. A system of adversarial justice cannot function
without public confidence in judges' abilities and fairness any
more than one could play baseball without an umpire or basketball without a referee.78

[Tihe public's confidence in the integrity of the judiciary rests in large
part on a widespread understanding and acceptance of the strict (sometimes frustrating and inhibiting) rules of conduct under which we operate. It is that confidence in our integrity which provides the moral legitimacy upon which the power of an appointed judiciary rests.
In re Charge of Judicial Misconduct or Disability, Nos. 94-8 & 94-9, slip op. at 8
(D.C. Cir. Dec. 30, 1994) (Kessler, J., writing separately); see also Liljeberg v. Health
Servs. Acquisition Corp., 486 U.S. 847 (1988) (holding that a judge who served as
trustee of a university should have known of the university's interest in the case
and therefore should have recused himself from the case); Haines v. Liggett Group,
Inc., 975 F.2d 81, 98 (3d Cir. 1992) (stating that "the right to trial by an impartial
judge [was] 'a basic requirement of due process'" (citations omitted)). Whether federal
judges actually possess these attributes is a matter that some academics have seriously questioned. See MARK TUSHNET, RED, WHITE, AND BLUE: A CRITIcAL ANALYSIS
OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 46-60, 111-46 (1988); Peter Gabel & Duncan Kennedy, Roll

Over Beethoven, 36 STAN. L. REV. 1, 33-41 (1984). Interestingly, criticism of the neutrality of judges comes not only from the left, but also from the right. See, e.g., ROBERT H. BOMR, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA 15-18, 69-74, 129-32 (1990) (suggesting
that judicial activism reflects broad-based, transformational social changes and thus
follows no single political trajectory).
76. See Suri Rathapala, John Locke's Doctrine of the Separation of Powers: A Reevaluation, 38 Ahl. J. JuRIS. 189, 207-08 (1993).
77. See generally Charles Fried, The Lawyer as Friend: The Moral Foundations of
the Lawyer-Client Relation, 85 YALE L.J. 1060, 1062-65, 1071-75, 1080-89 (1976) (discussing the role of the lawyer in the adversarial system).
78. See, e.g., Burdett v. Miller, 957 F.2d 1375, 1380 (7th Cir. 1992) ("[Judges]
want to do justice as well as merely umpire disputes .... ."); see also Stephen
Landsman, A Brief Survey of the Development of the Adversary System, 44 OHIO ST.
L.J. 713, 715 (1983) ("Adversary theory .. . suggests that neutrality and passivity
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The need for impartiality is accentuated in the federal courts,
which for the past four decades have enjoyed principal responsibility for overseeing the recognition and application of a variety
of textual and nontextual constitutional rights, including the
guarantees set forth in the Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth
Amendment.79 Federal judges, called upon to decide particularly thorny issues of social policy," must both appear to be and
act as honest brokers among countless interest groups.
1. JudicialBehavior Under the SRA Does Not Measure Up
Viewed in light of Locke's proposition that no person should
be a judge in his own case, the SRA appears to suffer from some
rather serious structural defects."' Because the SRA vests judges with law-making power, the potential exists for a collapse of
the separation of powers: the SRA vests the same federal judges
with law-making power, to be exercised while they retain their
law-interpreting powers over their own work product. 2 Accordingly, one would assume that Sentencing Commissioners/judges

[of a judge] are essential . . . to convince society that the judicial system is trustworthy."); William H. Rehnquist, Address, Seen in a Glass Darkly: The Future of the
Federal Courts, 1993 WIS. L. REV. 1, 8 (stating that the imperatives of the adversarial system require judges to referee disputes rather than "actively manage
their resolution from beginning to end"); Simon H. Rifkind, The Lawyer's Role and
Responsibility in Modern Society, 30 REC. 534, 535-45 (1975) (commenting on a
lawyer's role in the adversarial system). But ef MARVIN E. FRANKEL, PARTISAN JUSTICE 11-19 (1980) (suggesting that despite idealized conceptions of justice, the skills
of attorneys still will carry the outcome in an adversarial system).
79. See, e.g., Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452, 473 (1974) (declining to require
exhaustion of state judicial remedies, and "recognizing the paramount role Congress
has assigned to the federal courts to protect constitutional rights").
80. See, e.g., Quill v. Vacco, 80 F.3d 716 (2d Cir.) (holding that physician-assisted
suicide is a fundamental right protected by the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment), cert. granted, 117 S. Ct. 36 (1996); Compassion in Dying v.
Washington, 79 F.3d 790 (9th Cir.) (holding that the substantive aspect of the Due
Process Clause protects a patient's right to seek physician-assisted suicide in some
circumstances), cert. granted, 117 S. Ct. 37 (1996).
81. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 991-998 (1994); see generally Lewis J. Liman, The Constitutional Infirmities of the United States Sentencing Commission, 96 YALE L.J. 1363,
1387 (1987) ("The type of legislative rulemaking that the Sentencing Commission
will engage in.. . breaks with the separation of powers in allowing the Ijudges]
who promulgated rules to also apply them.").
82. See Liman, supra note 81, at 1387.
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would recuse themselves from cases involving direct challenges
to the validity of the Sentencing Commission's work product.
Such a course of action would comport with Mistretta's apparent
assumption that judges serving as Sentencing Commissioners
would not sit in judgment in cases challenging the legality of
their own work product."
In the seven years following the Supreme Court's decision in
Mistretta, three circuits have addressed whether a Sentencing
Commissioner must recuse himself in cases involving the application of the guidelines." In two of the cases, federal circuit
judges refused to recuse themselves;' in the third, a panel of
the Eleventh Circuit required a district judge serving as a Sentencing Commissioner to recuse herself after she herself failed to
do so.'
Then-Judge Stephen Breyer was the first federal judge to address whether Sentencing Commissioners routinely should recuse themselves in cases involving the application of the
guidelines." Given the potential conflict between Judge
Breyer's service as a Sentencing Commissioner and a federal
appellate judge, he thought "it seem[ed] desirable to consider the
question of recusal systematically and in writing."'
Judge Breyer asked both the local United States Attorney and

83. See Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 406-07 (1989) ("That federal
judges participate in the promulgation of guidelines does not affect their or other
judges' ability to impartially adjudicate sentencing issues."); id. at 407 ("While the
problem of individual bias is usually cured through recusal, no such mechanism can
overcome the appearance of institutional partiality that may arise from judiciary
involvement in the making of policy.").
84. See United States v. McLellan, 28 F.3d 117 (11th Cir. 1994) (unpublished per
curiam opinion); United States v. Glick, 946 F.2d 335 (4th Cir. 1991); United States
v. Wright, 873 F.2d 437 (1st Cir. 1989).
85. See Glick, 946 F.2d at 336-37; Wright, 873 F.2d at 445-47 (Breyer, J., writing
separately).
86. See In re United States, 60 F.3d 729, 730-31 (11th Cir.) (describing the holding of McLellan), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 828 (1995). Significantly, Judge Julie
Carnes, the district court judge in question, declined to recuse herself, notwithstanding her dual service as a Sentencing Commissionerjudge. See id. Evidently, following
Justice Blackmun's advice, see Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 404, Judge Carnes was prepared to put away her Sentencing Commissioner hat and review the Commission's
work product while wearing her federal district judge hat.
87. See Wright, 873 F.2d at 445-47 (Breyer, J., writing separately).
88. Id. at 446 (Breyer, J., writing separately).
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the public defender assigned to the case to provide advice on the
recusal issue.89 They provided six reasons why Sentencing
Commissioners should not recuse themselves routinely from
cases involving the application of the guidelines:
(1) A Sentencing Commissioner's work is "essentially
neutral."
(2) The legislative history of the SRA suggests that Congress
did not believe Sentencing Commissioners routinely would recuse themselves from cases involving the guidelines.91
(3) Sentencing Commissioners would have particular expertise
with the guidelines; this expertise would be lost if they routinely
recused themselves from guidelines cases.92
(4) Judges serving on federal rules committees do not routinely recuse themselves from cases involving the application of
those rules.9
(5) State court judges serving on state Sentencing Commissions do not routinely recuse themselves from cases requiring
them to apply their work product. 4
(6) Routine recusal unfairly would increase the workload of
judges who were not Sentencing Commissioners.95
Thus, both the government and defense counsel agreed that
recusal as a matter of course was not warranted.9s6
In its amicus brief, however, the Department of Justice suggested two narrow exceptions in which a federal judge who also
had served, or who was serving currently, as a Sentencing Commissioner should recuse himself: first, when "there is a substantial challenge" to the existence of the guidelines system;97 and
second, "where a judge/Commissioner has previously expressed

89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.

See id. (Breyer, J., writing separately).
Id. (Breyer, J., writing separately).
See id. (Breyer, J., writing separately).
See id. (Breyer, J., writing separately).
See id. (Breyer, J., writing separately).
See id. (Breyer, J., writing separately).
See id. (Breyer, J., writing separately).
See id. at 447 (Breyer, J., writing separately).
Id. (Breyer, J., writing separately).
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views on the merits of the particular case that is being considered by his court."8 These exceptions "are narrow." 9 The first
exception would apply only when the challenge would "jeopardize the continued existence of the Guidelines system."0 0 The
second would apply only when a particular commissioner has
commented on the merits of a specific case, and "does not include instances where a judge/Commissioner
has expressed gen10°
eral views on. sentencing policy."
Based on the parties' submissions, Judge Breyer concluded
that recusal was not warranted in the case at hand, which involved only the routine application of the guidelines to a particular defendant.0 2 He stated that:
In light of these considerations, I shall not recuse myself in
this case, where no special circumstances are present, nor
shall I automatically recuse myself in typical Guidelines cases, unless they involve a serious legal challenge to the Guidelines themselves."3
He nevertheless intended to "entertain any motion for recusal
that is made."'
Following Judge Breyer's approach in Wright requires recusal
only when a defendant attacks the very existence of the guidelines system.0 5 If a defendant merely objects to Judge Breyer
passing on the meaning, or even the legality, of a particular
guideline, it would appear that Judge Breyer would deny the
motion for recusal."°6 Accordingly, in at least some cases,
Judge Breyer would sit in judgment over the legality of his own
work product; he would serve as a judge in his own case.' 7
In United States v. Glick,' a second Sentencing Commis98. Id. (Breyer, J., writing separately).
99. Id. (Breyer, J., writing separately).
100. Id. (Breyer, J., writing separately).
101. Id. (Breyer, J., writing separately).
102. See id. (Breyer, J., writing separately).
103. Id. (Breyer, J., writing separately).
104. Id. (Breyer, J., writing separately).
105. See supra text accompanying note 102.
106. See Wright, 873 F.2d at 446 (Breyer, J., writing separately).
107. See id. (Breyer, J., writing separately); cf Locke, supra note 10, §§ 87-91, at
341-45 (explaining that in a state of nature everyone is his own judge).
108. 946 F.2d 335 (4th Cir. 1991).
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sioner/judge faced the recusal issue; Judge William W. Wilkins
of the Fourth Circuit followed Judge Breyer's lead in Wright.'0 9
Facing a motion to recuse himself based on his service as a Sentencing Commissioner, Judge Wilkins noted that "[a] judge must
recuse himself from a 'proceeding in which his impartiality
might reasonably be questioned' .... When there is no reasonable basis for questioning a judge's impartiality, however, it
would be improper for the judge to recuse himself.""0 Judge
Wilkins concluded that, "[blecause no special circumstances that
would cause a reasonable person to question my impartiality are
presented by this appeal, I shall not recuse myself.""' As in
Wright, Glick involved a routine application of the guidelines; in
neither case did the defendant challenge the legality of a particular guideline or the guidelines system as a whole."'
Finally, in United States v. McLellan,"' the defendant, Louis
Curtis McLellan, objected to District Judge Julie Carnes's ruling
on his claim that the Sentencing Commission was unconstitutional."' Judge Carnes declined to recuse herself, notwithstanding her service as a Sentencing Commissioner. "' On appeal, a panel of the Eleventh Circuit reversed, holding that
Judge Carnes's dual service as a Sentencing Commissioner/judge
gave rise to an appearance of impropriety." 6
The McLellan panel, however, did not publish its decision, and
a subsequent panel of the court refused to embrace the McLellan
panel's reasoning."' In In re United States, an Eleventh Circuit panel declared that it "emphatically disavow[ed] ... any

109. See id. at 336-37; Wright, 873 F.2d at 437; supra notes 87-104 and accompanying text.
110. Glick, 946 F.2d at 336-37 (quoting 28 U.S.C.A. § 455(a) (West Supp. 1991)).
111. Id. at 337. Judge Wilkins stated: "Indeed, because recusal is not required, I
am obligated to participate." Id.
112. See id.; Wright, 873 F.2d at 437.
113. 28 F.3d 117 (11th Cir. 1994) (unpublished per curiam opinion).
114. See id.; see also In re United States, 60 F.3d 729, 730-31 (11th Cir.) (discussing
the unpublished opinion of the court in McLellan), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 828 (1995).
115. See In re United States, 60 F.3d at 730 (discussing the unpublished opinion of
the court in McLellan).
116. See McLellan, 28 F.3d 117; see also In re United States, 60 F.3d at 730-31 (describing the holding of the unpublished opinion of the court in McLellan); see also 28
U.S.C. § 455(a), (b)(4) (1994) (delineating when a judge should disqualify himself).
117. See In re United States, 60 F.3d at 731 n.2.
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intention to adopt in this published opinion the prior McLellan
opinion's holding on the recusal issue.""' Because the
McLellan panel's decision was not published, "its holding on the
recusal issue is not the law of this circuit and will not be binding on any future panel in a case involving a different defendant.""' As a technical matter, the In re United States panel
"express[ed] no view on the recusal issue. 120 The tone of the
opinion, however, strongly suggests that the subsequent panel
disagreed with the McClellan panel's reasoning.
2. Toward Fashioninga PracticableStandard To Govern the
Recusal of Judges Who Also Serve As Sentencing
Commissioners
In the wake of cases like Wright and In re United States, a
criminal defendant faced with the prospect of being sentenced,
or having his appeal heard, by a judge who serves as a Sentencing Commissioner has little cause for optimism regarding the
prospects of obtaining that judge's voluntary recusal. 12 ' It
would be wrong, however, to conclude that a recusal motion in
such circumstances automatically would prove to be a wasted effort. Both Glick and McClellan suggest that some courts would
be receptive to such a motion on the proper facts.' 22
Of the four cases decided to date, Glick provides the best standard by which to govern the recusal of Sentencing Commissioners/judges, and clearly is the least problematic decision of the
group."2 Judge Wilkins determined that his participation in
hearing Glick's appeal could not give rise to a reasonable inference of an appearance of impropriety."2 Because Glick in-

118. Id.
119. Id.

120. Id.
121. See United States v. Wright, 873 F.2d 437 (lst Cir. 1989); In re United States,
60 F.3d at 729.
122. See United States v. Glick, 946 F.2d 335 (4th Cir. 1991); United States v.
McLellan, 28 F.3d 117 (11th Cir. 1994) (unpublished per curiam opinion).
123. See Glick, 946 U.S. at 336-37.
124. See id.; see also 28 U.S.C. § 455(a) (1994) (requiring that "any ...judge ...
shall disqualify himself in any proceeding in which his impartiality might be reasonably questioned").
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volved the routine application of the guidelines," this conclusion appears sound. Moreover, the analytical framework set
forth by Judge Wilkins would require recusal in cases in which
a judge's participation created the appearance of impropriety,
presumably including cases in which he was called upon to determine the legality of his own work product. 2 '
The First Circuit correctly decided Wright on its own facts,
but the framework that the opinion established appears to permit judges to determine the legality of their own work product.127 Then-Judge Breyer's approach requires recusal only in
cases involving a defendant's challenge to the entire guidelines
system. 2 ' Nevertheless, if a defendant raises a legal challenge
to a single guideline, a Sentencing Commissioner/judge who
worked on creating that particular guideline should recuse him' The Wright standard, however, plainly would not comself."29
pel such a result.130
Indeed, Wright appears to permit a Sentencing Commissioner
to effectively wear two hats with respect to a particular defendant: the Sentencing Commissioner/judge serves both as the
lawgiver and as the judge charged with determining the law's
legality.'' Such a combination of law making and adjudication
deprives an affected defendant of the structural protection of our
Constitution's System of checks and balances." 2 Accordingly,
Wright must be rejected in favor of a stricter standard for
recusal.
Finally, the Eleventh Circuit appears to have reached the
125. See Glick, 946 U.S. at 337.
126. See id.
127. See United States v. Wright, 873 F.2d 437, 445-47 (1st Cir. 1989) (Breyer, J.,
writing separately).
128. See id. at 447 (Breyer, J., writing separately).
129. See CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT FOR UNITED STATES JUDGES Canon 5(G)
(1974) ("A judge should not ... accept such an appointment if the judge's governmental duties would interfere with the performance of judicial duties or tend to undermine the public confidence in the integrity, impartiality, or independence of the
judiciary . . .

).

130. See Wright, 873 F.2d at 447 (Breyer, J., writing separately).
131. See id. (Breyer, J., writing separately).
132. See Brown, supra note 64, at 1514-16, 1531-40; see also Redish & Cisar, supra
note 4, at 474-78 (discussing the need for pragmatic formalism to insure against "the
accretion of even potentially abusive power").
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right result in McLellan: a Sentencing Commissioner/district
court judge cannot adjudicate, alone, a challenge to the legality
of the guidelines.133 The In re United States panel, however,
expressly disavowed any intention of following McLellan."' In
consequence, it is difficult to determine the standard that the
Eleventh Circuit would apply to such cases. Presumably, however, at least three judges of the court (the McLellan panel) do not
think that it is appropriate for a judge to serve as both a lawgiver and as an adjudicator.'35 Even if the Eleventh Circuit were
to embrace formally the result in McLellan, the McLellan court's
standard for evaluating recusal motions 3 does not address
more routine cases that merely involve the application of a particular guideline (rather than a challenge to the guidelines system itself).
A criminal defendant challenging the legality of a particular
sentencing guideline may reasonably expect that the author of
the guideline will not sit in judgment over the challenge,3 7 because persons with a professional and personal interest in the
outcome of a dispute should not be deemed competent to sit in
judgment. 3 ' The lower court decisions addressing the propri133. See In re United States, 60 F.3d 729, 730-31 (11th Cir.) (discussing the unpublished per curiam opinion of United States v. McLellan, 28 F.3d 117 (11th Cir.
1994)), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 828 (1995). On these facts, even Justice Breyer would
recuse himself. Cf Wright, 873 F.2d at 447 (stating that a recusal may be appropriate in cases involving "a serious legal challenge to the Guidelines themselves")
(Breyer, J., writing separately).
134. See In re United States, 60 F.3d at 731 n.2.
135. United States v. McLellan, 28 F.3d 117 (11th Cir. 1994) (unpublished per
curiam decision).
136. See id.
137. Cf. STRAUSS, supra note 44, at 622 ("Wherever she is located in government, a
judge ought not be connected with the controversy or the parties . . . ."). For example, imagine a district court judge serving on the appellate panel and reviewing the
correctness of her own decision as a district court judge. Plainly, a district court
judge cannot hear an appeal of her own decision. The situation is no different when
a Sentencing Commissioner is called upon to decide the legality of a particular
guideline. Likewise, district judges construe the meaning of their prior decisions on a
daily basis; there is no prohibition on a district judge's application of decisional rules
that she fashioned in prior opinions. So too, a Sentencing Commissioner/judge should
be free to apply the guidelines in routine cases, because the act of applying the
guidelines does not put into question the impartiality of the judge. Simply put, there
is no reason to believe that a judge who crafts a particular decisional principle will
be incapable of applying that principle fairly.
138. See Locke, supra note 10; see also 28 U.S.C. § 455(a), (b) (1994) (discussing
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ety of such behavior in the context of the sentencing guidelines-particularly Wright-suggest, however, that the propriety
of this behavior is unclear to some members of the federal judiciary. It is, of course, possible that these courts correctly read
Mistretta to mean that judges can pass on the legality of their
own work product; if that is indeed a proper reading, then
Mistrettawas decided wrongly.
II. MORRISON: SMOKE GETS IN YOUR EYES

A. A Review of the Morrison Holding
Morrison v. Olson"9 involved a challenge to the constitutionality of the independent counsel provisions of the Ethics in Government Act.'4 Under these provisions, the Attorney General
may investigate alleged wrongdoing within the executive branch
and, if "good cause" exists to believe that wrongdoing might have
occurred, recommend the appointment of an "independent counsel" to investigate the matter further and prosecute any criminal
wrongdoing.' If the Attorney General concludes that "good
cause" exists for the appointment of an independent counsel, she
must file a request for the appointment of an independent counsel with the "Special Division," a court created to consider the
After receiving a reAttorney General's recommendations.
of an indethe
appointment
for
General
quest from the Attorney
an
appoint
pendent counsel, the Special Division must then
independent counsel and "define that independent counsel's
prosecutorial jurisdiction."'
In 1982 and 1983, Congress and the Justice Department of

disqualification of justices, judges, or magistrates).
139. 487 U.S. 654 (1988).
140. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 591-599.
141. See id. § 591.
142. See id. §§ 592-593.
143. Id. § 593(b)(1). The Special Division also receives the Attorney General's recommendations not to appoint an independent counsel. See id. § 592(b)(1). The Special Division, however, cannot appoint an independent counsel over the AttorneyGeneral's negative recommendation. See id. For a discussion of the events that led
Congress to enact the independent counsel provisions of the Ethics in Government
Act, see In re Olson, 818 F.2d 34, 39-46 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
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the Reagan Administration became embroiled in a controversy
over the administration's commitment (or lack thereof) to enforcing the Superfund provisions of CERCLA.'" Pursuant to its
oversight authority, Congress asked the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and the Justice Department to produce certain documents relevant to the enforcement of the Superfund
provisions.'45 Invoking executive privilege, the EPA and Justice Department refused to produce a number of documents requested by Congress. 46
Following resolution of its investigation of the administration's enforcement of CERCLA, the House Judiciary Committee
began an investigation into the Justice Department's conduct
during the controversy. 47 The committee produced a report
that concluded, among other things, that Theodore Olson, Assistant Attorney General for the Office of Legal Counsel, had made
false and misleading statements to Congress, and that Edward
C. Schmults, Deputy Attorney General, and Carol E. Dinkins,
Assistant Attorney General for the Land and Natural Resources
Division, unlawfully had withheld certain information from the
committee during the pendency of its investigation.' Based on
this report, the chairman of the House Judiciary Committee
asked that the Attorney General request the appointment of an
independent counsel to prosecute any criminal wrongdoing related to the withholding of the information."
The Attorney General petitioned the Special Division to appoint an independent counsel. 50 In April 1986, the Special Division appointed James C. McKay as independent counsel,'
charging him with the task of investigating whether criminal
charges should be brought based on Olson's alleged false and

144. See In re Olson, 818 F.2d at 35; 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1994).
145. See Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 665-67 (1988).
146. See id. at 665.
147. See id. at 665-66.
148. See id.; H.R. REP. No. 99-435, at 640-55 (1985); Ruth Marcus, Ex-Officials'
Testimony Not 'Designed to Conceal", WAsH. POST, Mar. 21, 1989, at A4 (discussing
decision not to prosecute former Justice Department official Theodore B. Olson).
149. See Morrison, 487 U.S. at 666-67.
150. See id.
151. See id. at 667.
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misleading statements to the Committee.152 McKay resigned
during the pendency of his investigation, and the Special Division appointed Alexia Morrison to replace him." 3
Morrison subsequently sought and obtained subpoenas to take
the depositions of Olson, Schinults, and Dinkins." Olson,
Schmults, and Dinkins responded to the subpoenas by challenging the constitutionality of the independent counsel provisions. "5 They argued that the provisions violated the Appointments Clause 55 by vesting appointment of executive officers in
the courts and violated the separation of powers doctrine by
unduly limiting presidential control over an executive function,
prosecutions, and by transferring executive power to the judicial
branch. 57
The Supreme Court rejected each of these challenges. 58
First, it found that an independent counsel constituted an "inferior" officer for purposes of applying the Appointments
Clause.'59 As a result, Congress could vest the power to appoint independent counsel within the federal courts."o Second,
the Court rejected the claim that the Ethics in Government Act
required judges to assume an executive function 6 ' stating,
that "[tihe Act simply does not give the Division the power to
'supervise' the independent counsel in the exercise of his or her
investigative or prosecutorial authority."" 2
Although the Court was "more doubtful" about the Special

152. See id.
153. See id.
154. See id. at 668.
155. See id.
156. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
157. See Morrison, 487 U.S. at 668-69; see also In re Sealed Case, 838 F.2d 476
(D.C. Cir. 1988) (holding that the independent counsel provisions of the Ethics in
Government Act were unconstitutional on separation of powers grounds), rev'd sub
nom. Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654 (1988).
158. See Morrison, 487 U.S. at 670-97.
159. See id. at 670-77.
160. See id. For a distinctly different point of view on these questions, see Judge
Silberman's opinion for the D.C. Circuit panel that initially decided Morrison. In re
Sealed Case, 838 F.2d at 478-518.
161. See Morrison, 487 U.S. at 680-81.
162. Id. at 681.
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Division's ability to terminate an independent counsel,"e it
avoided finding any constitutional infirmity in this arrangement
by strictly limiting the Special Division's authority: "As we see
it, 'termination' may occur only when the duties of the counsel
are truly 'completed' or 'so substantially completed' that there
remains no need for any continuing action by the independent
counsel."" Under this limiting construction, "the Special
Division's power to terminate does not pose a sufficient threat of
judicial intrusion into matters that are more properly within the
Executive's authority to require that the Act be invalidated.""6
Finally, the Court turned aside separation of powers challenges based on the President's circumscribed ability to re'move or
oversee the independent counsel. 66 Applying a functionalist
analysis, the majority found that the removal provisions did not
"'impermissibly undermine[ I' the powers of the Executive
Branch... or 'disrupt[ I the proper balance between the
coordinate branches [by] preventling] the Executive Branch from
accomplishing its constitutionally assigned functions."'6 7
In an impassioned dissent, Justice Scalia argued that the independent counsel provisions of the Ethics in Government Act
impermissibly stripped the executive branch of one of its constitutional functions." Justice Scalia argued that "[i]t is not for
us to determine, and we have never presumed to determine, how
much of the purely executive powers of government must be
within the full control of the President."'69 This is so because
"[tihe Constitution prescribes that they all are." 7 '
Neither Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing for the eight-Justice
majority, nor Justice Scalia, in dissent, focused on the effects
that service by Article III judges on the Special Division would

163. See id. at 682.
164. Id. at 682-83.
165. Id. at 683.
166. See id. at 695-96.
167. Id. at 695 (alterations in original) (citations omitted).
168. See id. at 697-99, 703-15 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
169. Id. at 709 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
170. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting); see also Brian C. Murchison, The Concept of Independence in Public Law, 41 EMORY L.J. 961, 1010-11 (1992) (arguing that Justice
Scalia's concerns in Morrison stem from a belief that the appointments process under the independent counsel law is not really independent at all).
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have on the public's perception of the Article III judiciary. Both
the majority and Justice Scalia implicitly assumed that appointing independent counsel would not impede or interfere with the
exercise of core Article III powers.' 71
Certainly, such an assumption is not unreasonable. Judges
routinely appoint clerks, secretaries, and other court personnel.
They appoint special masters and trustees. They even appoint
counsel in certain cases involving indigent parties. None of these
functions is thought to undermine the ability of the Article III
impartially the cases or controversies
courts to decide fairly and
172
that come before them.
None of these duties, however, embroil the federal courts directly in partisan interbranch disputes. Neither the majority nor
Justice Scalia considered whether service on the Special Division
was problematic because it might place judges in a role that
would "interfere with the performance of judicial duties or tend
to undermine the public confidence in the integrity, impartiality,
or independence of the judiciary."17 Subsequent events have
171. See Morrison, 487 U.S. at 677-85, 697 n.16; id. at 697-734 (Scalia, J., dissenting). In a 37-page dissent, Justice Scalia never addressed the possible effects of judicial selection of independent counsel on the Article III courts.
172. Moreover, the Appointments Clause plainly gives Congress the ability to vest
the appointment of some "executive" officers with the Courts: "[Tihe Congress may
by Law vest the Appointment of such inferior Officers, as they think proper, in the
President alone, in the Courts of Law, or in the heads of Departments." U.S. CONST.
art. II, § 2, cl. 2. Although this language could be construed to permit courts to appoint only judicial support staff, the weight of authority supports a broader construction. See 3 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED
STATES § 1529, at 385-86 (Leonard W. Levy ed., 1970); Letters from The Federal
Farmer (Jan. 17, 1788), in 2 THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST 307-09 (Herbert J.
Storing ed., 1981); Donald J. Simon, The Constitutionality of the Special Prosecutor
Law, 16 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 45, 63-69 (1982); see also Go-Bart Importing Co. v.
United States, 282 U.S. 344, 352-53 (1931) (recognizing that the United States commissioners appointed by the district courts are inferior officers); Rice v. Ames, 180
U.S. 371, 378 (1901) (discussing Congress's right to invest the district courts with
the power of appointment duties for certain inferior officers); Ex parte Siebold, 100
U.S. 371, 397-98 (1879) (holding that the Appointments Clause gives Congress, at its
discretion, the power to vest certain appointments with either the President or the
federal courts); Hobson v. Hansen, 265 F. Supp. 902 (D.D.C. 1967) (addressing the
constitutionality of a statute allowing United States district court judges to appoint
the members of the District of Columbia's board of education); United States v. Solomon, 216 F. Supp. 835 (S.D.N.Y. 1963) (addressing the constitutionality of district
court judges appointing, pursuant to a statute, United States attorneys).
173. Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 404 n.27 (1989) (citing CODE OF JU-
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demonstrated that service on the Special Division will, from
time to time, place judicial personnel at the very heart of highly
partisan interbranch disputes in nonjudicial roles.174 This state
of affairs is problematic for many reasons, not the least of which
is the negative effect on the public's overall confidence in the
impartiality and fairness of the federal judiciary that results
from permitting judges to act as partisan agents.
For better or worse, the citizenry expects that federal judges
will not serve as partisan agents.'75 The reason for this expectation is relatively simple: the courts are the ultimate arbiters of
many divisive social issues. Matters that the Congress or state
legislatures cannot or will not address often wind up before the
federal judiciary.17 In consequence, the citizenry is acutely
aware of the importance of judicial appointments; for example, a
wide variety of organizations and interest groups closely monitor
the appointment and confirmation of federal judges.'77
The public's confidence in the judiciary's ability to decide
these issues rests in no small part on the presumption that substantive and procedural norms of a nonpolitical (or apolitical)
nature govern judicial behavior.178 Indeed, the popular mytholCanon 5(G) (1974)).
174. See infra text accompanying notes 186-236.
175. Cf. Brannon P. Denning, Can the Simple Cite Be Trusted?: Lower Court Interpretations of United States v. Miller and the Second Amendment, 26 CUMB. L. REV.
961, 969 (1996) (noting that the desire for the public to view courts as "rendering
judgments untainted by partisan concerns or by public pressure" motivated the
Framers' decision to grant judges life tenure).
176. See Frank M. Johnson, Jr., The Alabama Punting Syndrome, JUDGES' J.,
Spring 1979, at 4-17, 53; Frank M. Johnson, Jr., In Defense of JudicialActivism, 28
EMORY L.J. 901, 906-09 (1979); see also Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483
(1954) (holding that the separate but equal doctrine as applied to public schools denied blacks equal protection of the law); Pugh v. Locke, 406 F. Supp. 318 (M.D. Ala.
1976), affd in part sub nom. Newman v. Alabama, 559 F.2d 283 (5th Cir. 1977)
(finding that conditions of confinement in the Alabama penal system constituted cruel and unusual punishment); Wyatt v. Stickney, 344 F. Supp. 373 and 344 F. Supp.
387 (M.D. Ala. 1972), affd in part sub nom. Wyatt v. Aderholt, 503 F.2d 1305 (5th
Cir. 1974) (holding that the Constitution guarantees civilly committed persons a
right to treatment and that granting relief did not intrude upon any decision-making
area reserved for the state legislature).
DICIAL CONDUCT FOR UNITED STATES JUDGES

177. See STEPHEN L. CARTER, THE CONFIRMATION MESS 3-22, 90-96 (1994); see gen-

erally BORK, supra note 75, at 278-93 (discussing the scrutiny that accompanied his
nomination to the Supreme Court).
178. See Wechsler, supra note 20, at 2-10.
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ogy of the federal judiciary includes liberal reliance on a supposed law-making/law-interpreting dichotomy that ostensibly
cabins judicial policy-making power.' Put simplistically, judges are meant merely to interpret existing law; they do not create
it out of whole cloth.18 Whether justified or not, the public's
confidence in the detached nonpartisan character of the federal
judiciary is essential to its continued effectiveness (if not its
legitimacy). Federal judges therefore must avoid undertaking
tasks that place them in overtly political roles, because if judges
are really only another subset of politicians, then their special
claim to expertise in "say[ing] what the law is" 8 ' must ring
hollow.'82
Because the Special Division has appointed prosecutors in
politically charged interbranch disputes (and is expected to do so
again in the future), it is essential that the members of the Special Division take care to ensure that, in discharging their duties
under the Ethics in Government Act, they do not undermine
their ability to function as Article III judges. The Supreme Court
emphasized in Mistretta that even if the Constitution does not
strictly prohibit federal judges from assuming extrajudicial duties, not "every extrajudicial service would be compatible with,
or appropriate to, continuing service on the bench; nor does it
mean that Congress may require a federal judge to assume extrajudicial duties as long as the judge is assigned those duties in
an individual, not judicial, capacity."" The "ultimate inquiry"
is "whether a particular extrajudicial assignment undermines
the integrity of the Judicial Branch."' Events subsequent to
179. See generally BORK, supra note 75, at 110-26 (describing the tendency of some

judges to deny elected representatives right to base laws on morality); cf TUSHNET,
supra note 75, at 108-46 (discussing the Court's reliance on moral philosophy as a
theory of judicial review).
180. Cf BORI, supra note 75, at 15-18 (noting that judicial activism has generated

much public controversy).
181. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803); see also BRUCE
ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE 192-99 (1991) (noting the inherent weaknesses in the

Court's ability to abuse its power to interpret the Constitution).
182. See generally Richard Delgado, Playing Favorites, 74 TEX. L. REV. 1223, 122326 (1996) (arguing that federal judges are inherently political actors and citing City
of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989), in support of this position).

183. Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 404 (1988).
184. Id. It bears noting that the Code of Conduct for United States Judges prohib-
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the Morrison decision have demonstrated that Morrison failed to
provide sufficiently clear guidance to the lower courts regarding
the avoidance of activities that tend to "undermine[ I the integrity of the Judicial Branch. " "
B. Of Judges, Politicians,and Senate Cafeterias
In January 1994, Attorney General Janet Reno appointed former Judge Robert B. Fiske, Jr. to serve as a "special" prosecutor,
and charged him with investigating certain Arkansas real estate
transactions related to a development on the Whitewater
River.186 While he was Governor of Arkansas, President Bill
Clinton and First Lady Hillary Rodham Clinton had invested in
the development at the behest of James McDougal, an Arkansas
banker. Several prominent Arkansas Republicans subsequently
alleged that the Clintons had faced no real financial risk in the
deal and had received undeserved dividends.'87 The bank that
its a judge from undertaking an assignment that would tend to compromise the
public's confidence in his ability to serve as a neutral adjudicator. The Code provides
that:
A judge should not accept appointment to a governmental committee,
commission, or other position that is concerned with issues of fact or policy on matters other than the improvement of the law, the legal system,
or the administration of justice, unless appointment of a judge is required by Act of Congress. A judge should not, in any event, accept such
an appointment if the judge's governmental duties would interfere with
the performance of judicial duties or tend to undermine the integrity,
impartiality, or independence of the judiciary.
CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT FOR UNITED STATES JUDGES Canon 5(G) (1974).

This clause suggests that federal judges must refuse service either as a Sentencing Commissioner or as a member of the Special Division if such service would
tend to undermine the public's faith in their ability to discharge their Article III
duties. See generally In re Charge of Judicial Misconduct or Disability, Nos. 94-8 &
94-9, slip op. at 4-5 (D.C. Cir. Dec. 30, 1994) (Tatel, J. writing separately) (citing
Cannon 5(G) in support of the position that service on the Special Division cannot
encompass duties that threaten a federal judge's appearance of propriety).
185. Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 393.
186. See David Johnston, Counsel Granted a Broad Mandate in Clinton Inquiry,
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 21, 1994, at Al; Stephen Labaton, Reno Is Said To Choose New
Yorker as Counsel, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 20, 1994, at A12; see also In re Charge of Judicial Misconduct or Disability, 39 F.3d 374, 376 (D.C. Cir. Judicial Couiicil), afl'd,
Nos. 94-8 & 94-9 (D.C. Cir. Dec. 30, 1994) (discussing events leading to the appointment of independent counsel); cf. 28 U.S.C. § 543 (1994) (authorizing the Attorney
General to appoint special prosecutors to assist United States attorneys).
187. See Johnston, supra note 186, at Al; Labaton, supra note 186, at A12. For a
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had provided the project's financing, Madison Guaranty Savings
& Loan Association, ultimately failed, necessitating a bailout of
the thrift institution using taxpayer funds.'" Essentially, the
GOP critics charged that the Whitewater investment was a
means of channelling financial gifts to then-Governor Clinton
and Hillary Rodham Clinton." 9
At the time of the Fiske appointment, the independent counsel provisions of the Ethics in Government Act had expired.'"
After the appointment, Congress reenacted the independent
counsel provisions of the Act.' 9 ' Attorney General Reno petitioned the Special Division to appoint Fiske, then serving as
"special counsel," to serve as the independent counsel.'92
Rather than simply giving the independent counsel appointment to Fiske, who, by this time, had made substantial progress
in his investigation, the Special Division instead fired Fiske and
appointed Kenneth W. Starr to serve as independent counsel.19 Starr's appointment proved controversial because of his
strong partisan ties to the Republican party. Starr had held a
number of prominent government jobs, including a post as an
assistant attorney general in the Reagan Justice Department,
judge on the D.C. Circuit, and Solicitor General of the United
States during the Bush Administration.' Following President
Bush's electoral defeat in 1992,
Starr became a partner in the
95
law firm of Kirkland & Ellis.

After leaving public office, Starr remained quite active in Re-

full chronology of the Whitewater matter, see The Unfolding of Whitewater, WASH.
POST, Jan. 21, 1994, at A20.
188. See The Unfolding of Whitewater, supra note 187, at A20.
189. See Michael Isikoff, Whitewater Special Counsel Promises 'Thorough' Probe,
WASH. POST, Jan. 21, 1994, at A20.
190. See Charge of Judicial Misconduct, 39 F.3d at 376.
191. See Independent Counsel Reauthorization Act of 1994, 28 U.S.C. §§ 591-599.
192. See Charge of Judicial Misconduct, 39 F.3d at 376-77.
193. See generally David Johnston, Three Judges Spurn Protest on Whitewater Prosecutor, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 19, 1994, at A16 (discussing Kenneth W. Starr's appointment as Independent Counsel).
194. See Jason DeParle, Verdict on a Counsel: Conservative but Not Rigid, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 22, 1994, at A9; Ruth Marcus, Republican Draws Criticism, Praise,
WASH. PoST, Aug. 6, 1994, at Al; Susan Schmidt, Judges Say They Lack Power To
Oust or Review Whitewater Counsel, WASH. POST, Aug. 19, 1994, at A12.
195. See Schneider, supra note 14, at A24.

1997]

MISTRETTA AND MORRISON REVISITED

449

publican politics. He was a frequent and critical commentator on
President Clinton's performance in office.196 Party officials also
touted Starr as a possible senatorial candidate in Virginia.'97
In sum, Kenneth Starr was (and is) a man with a definite political agenda.
Notwithstanding Starr's highly partisan activities, the Special
Division, headed by Judge David Sentelle, 95 appointed Starr
to replace Fiske on August 5, 1994.' The appointment generated a firestorm of controversy, based largely on the perception
that Starr was incapable of conducting the Whitewater inves-

tigation impartially.00
Later, the Washington Post reported that Judge Sentelle had
lunched with North Carolina Republican Senators Jesse Helms
and Lauch Faircloth in the Senate cafeteria prior to firing Fiske
and replacing him with Starr."0 ' This meeting led to speculation-denied by Judge Sentelle-that Senators Helms and
Faircloth had lobbied Judge Sentelle to replace Fiske.2 2 In ad196. See DeParle, supra note 194, at A9; Marcus, supra note 194, at Al.
197. See Marcus, supra note 194, at Al; Schmidt, supra note 194, at A12.
198. Judge Sentelle is a conservative Republican who gained his seat on the D.C.
Circuit in part through the efforts of North Carolina Senator Jesse Helms. See Toni
Locy, Judges' Politics Examined in Appointment of Starr To Direct Probe, WASH.
POST, Aug. 7, 1994, at A6; see also Appeals Judge for D.C. Named, WASH. POST,
Feb. 3, 1987, at A7 (reporting on Judge Sentelle's nomination and noting that he is
"a strong supporter of Jesse Helms ...
and a longtime activist in the Republican
party"); Ruth Marcus, North Carolina Judge Is Seen as Choice for Appellate Vacancy
Here, WASH. POST, Sept. 27, 1986, at A15 (discussing Judge Sentelle's close relationship with Senator Helms).
199. See In re Charge of Judicial Misconduct or Disability, 39 F.3d 374, 377 (D.C.
Cir. Judicial Council), affd, Nos. 94-8 & 94-9 (D.C. Cir. Dec. 30, 1994); Stephen
Labaton, The Whitewater Inquiry: The Decision; Judges Appoint New Prosecutor for
Whitewater, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 6, 1994, at Al; Susan Schmidt, Judges Replace Fiske
As Whitewater Counsel, WASH. POST, Aug. 6, 1994, at Al.
200. See Charles Fried, Messing with the Constitution, WASH. POST, Aug. 26, 1994,
at A25 (noting the "cries of politics raised by Democrats" following Starr's appointment); Johnston, supra note 186, at Al (describing the "smoldering controversy" surrounding Starr's appointment); Schmidt, supra note 14, at A9 (expressing doubt by
former ABA presidents as to Starr's impartiality in light of his Republican ties).
201. See Toni Locy & Marilyn W. Thompson, Lunch Among 'Old Friends' Causes
Latest Whitewater Ripple, WASH. POST, Aug. 24, 1994, at A3; Schneider, supra note
14, at A21. This news only added to the general outrage that followed the Special
Division's sacking of Mr. Fiske. See, e.g., Mr. Starr's Duty To Resign, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 18, 1994, at A22 (urging Starr to resign his position as independent counsel in
light of Judge Sentelle's ex parte contacts with Senators Helms and Faircloth).
202. See Charge of Judicial Misconduct, 39 F.3d at 382-83; Johnston, supra note
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dition, Judge Sentelle received a number of ex parte communications from the senators regarding the appointment of a
Whitewater independent counsel. 03
The D.C. Circuit Judicial Council received three separate corn
plaints arising from the lunch between Judge Sentelle and Sena
tors Helms and Faircloth and the ex parte letters.2 '" The complaints alleged that the lunch was improper and that Judge
Sentelle had an obligation to disclose certain correspondence
from these senators regarding the appointment of Whitewater
independent counsel, arguing that both types of ex parte contacts gave rise to an appearance of impropriety." 5

In a rather remarkable opinion, Chief Judge Harry T. Edwards, writing for the D.C. Circuit Judicial Council, dismissed
the ethics complaints against Judge Sentelle. °6 Judge
Edwards's opinion began with the assertion that "[t]hese complaints are misguided in their assumptions about the applicable
legal and ethical principles at issue." 7 According to Judge Edwards, "[c]ommon sense dictates and history confirms that prudent exercise of the appointment power under Article II necessitates consultation by those making appointments."05 After de-

186, at Al; Judges Err on Whitewater, supra note 14, at A26; Locy, supra note 198,
at A6. The fact that Senators Helms and Faircloth are among the most partisan and
ideologically conservative members of Congress only added fuel to the fire. See MICHAEL BARONE & GRANT UJIFUSA, THE ALMANAC OF AMERICAN POLITICS 1996, at

xiv-xvi, 991-93 (1996) (describing empirically Senator Helms's and Senator Faircloth's
extremist voting records in the Senate).
203. Schneider, supra note 14, at A21.
204. See Charge of Judicial Misconduct, 39 F.3d at 375; Toni Locy, Citizen Complaint Filed Over Starr Appointment, WASH. POST, Sept. 3, 1994, at A4; Toni Locy,
2nd Complaint Filed Against Sentelle, WASH. POST, Sept. 14, 1994, at A7.
205. See Charge of Judicial Misconduct, 39 F.3d at 375.
206. See id. at 382-83; Stephen Labaton, Judge Rules Fiske Removal Was Ethical,
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 3, 1994, at A24. Like the Special Division's initial decision to fire
Mr. Fiske, Judge Edwards's decision exonerating Judge Sentelle sparked harsh criticism from both the bar and the national press. See, e.g., Judges Err on Whitewater,
supra note 14, at A26 (describing Judge Edwards's justifications for Judge Sentelle's
behavior as "appalling"); Toni Locy, Former ABA Leaders Express Surprise at Response to Complaints About Judge, WASH. POST, Nov. 3, 1994, at A9 (expressing
"surprise" at Judge Edwards's indifference to the "appearance of impropriety" associated with Judge Sentelle's behavior).
207. Charge of Judicial Misconduct, 39 F.3d at 375-76.
208. Id. at 376.
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termining that the D.C. Circuit Judicial Council had jurisdiction
over the three complaints," 9 Judge Edwards turned his considerable analytical talents to a vigorous defense of substantial discretion in the kind and nature of ex parte contacts permitted
members of the Special Division incident to the appointment of
an independent counsel.21
Judge Edwards embarked on his analysis of the complainants'
claims by questioning their appreciation of the Special Division's
role: "Complainants' allegations, broadly referring to the 'appearance of impropriety,' and citing ethical strictures purportedly
applicable to the judge's conduct, are grounded in a fundamental
misunderstanding of the nature of the Special Division's authority."211 In short, the three individuals who challenged the pro-

priety of the lunch meeting and the ex parte letters simply
lacked the sophistication necessary to appreciate the fundamentally political nature of appointing an independent counsel.
Judge Edwards then went on to explain the true nature of the
appointments function.212
Judge Edwards noted that in formal Article III judicial proceedings, a judge's impartiality is expected: "A judge in a judicial
proceeding who reaches outside of the record to decide a case de
files the process."21" The appointment of an independent coun-

sel is not an "adversarial proceeding" in which judicial impartiality is essential.214 Accordingly, "[ilt makes little sense to
think that an authority acting pursuant to the Appointments
Clause of Article II might be forbidden from215consulting with others r.egarding candidates for appointment."

Indeed, Judge Edwards found it "hard to imagine how anyone
would go about that task without seeking advice."2 6
Analogizing to the President's appointment powers, Judge Edwards observed that "unfettered outside consultation is deemed

209.
210.
211.
212.
213.
214.
215.
216.

See id. at 377-78.
See id. at 378-83.
Id. at 379.
See id. at 380.
Id.
See id.
Id.
Id.
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so important that it may enjoy Constitutional protection."2 17
Because the appointment of an independent counsel is not a
formal "judicial proceeding," judges are not bound to observe the
same standards of conduct that govern the discharge of their
formal, Article III duties.2 18
Turning to the legislative history of the independent counsel
provisions of the Ethics in Government Act, Judge Edwards
found no support for the proposition that Congress intended
members of the Special Division to limit their ex parte contacts.1 9 "Congress has never expressed an intention to make
the appointment process itself independent of all 'nonjudicial'
influences outside of the Executive Branch."22 Finally, according to Judge Edwards, history endorses the practice of broad
consultation: "Division members have routinely relied on consultations with and recommendations from judicial colleagues, former professional associates, and other members of the so-called
'old-boy network'." 2"2'
Judge Edwards rested his defense of Judge Sentelle's conduct
by suggesting that the complainants lacked political savvy:
Whether or not the conduct of a judge of the Special Division
can ever have sufficient direct or indirect prejudicial effect on
the administration of the business of the courts to warrant
the exercise of the circuit's disciplinary authority, it is clear
that no such conduct occurred in this case. There may be
some members of society who would question the actions of
the accused judge, for they have a pristine (albeit arguably
naive) view of the appointment process. But this is irrelevant.
The simple point here is that, even accepting the complaints
as true for purposes of this analysis, the judge who has been
accused in this case would have violated no provision of law
or ethical Canon. There is no basis whatsoever for proceedings against this judge.'
Considering the nature of the questioned conduct, this statement

217. Id.
218.
219.
220.
221.
222.

See
See
Id.
Id.
Id.

id.
id. at 381-82.
at 382.
at 382-83.
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is extraordinary. It would appear that, from time to time, service
on the Special Division may require active Article III judges to
become mired in some of the most divisive political questions of
the day, but the public is to disregard this activity when evaluating a judge's ability to decide cases impartially."= At best,
this approach reflects a gross misunderstanding of the standard
of conduct that one reasonably should expect of an Article III
judge; at worst, it helps to confirm the cynical view held by some
within the academy that judging is little more than an exercise
in politics."
The full Judicial Council subsequently reviewed Judge
Edwards's opinion and affirmed it in an unpublished opinion." Moreover, in a subsequent case, the Judicial Council
embraced in a published decision Judge Edwards's reasoning
regarding a judge's broad consultative powers when exercising
the power of appointment under Article II.26 Thus, Judge
Edwards's views are hardly idiosyncratic and appear to reflect
the considered judgment of both the trial and appellate judges of
the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit." One could argue that rather than resolving the
question dispositively, however, these decisions merely com-

223. Without doubt, Whitewater has become a political issue. See Francis X. Clines,
Whitewater Nuance Yields to Politics, N.Y. TI=ES, Dec. 21, 1995, at B19 (likening
Whitewater to Watergate); Jerry Gray, Democrats Pull Plug on Senate Panel, for
Now, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 1, 1996, at A25 (describing the Whitewater inquiry as a "political witch hunt"); Howard Kurtz, Raging Al, WASH. POST MAG., May 22, 1994, at
W10 (describing Whitewater as Senator D'Amato's "one-man media offensive against
President Clinton"); Frank Rich, Cut to the Chase, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 17, 1996, at A19
(speculating as to Whitewater's potential effects on the 1996 presidential election).
224. See Gabel & Kennedy, supra note 75, at 33-36; Mark Tushnet, Critical Legal
Studies: A Political History, 100 YALE L.J. 1515, 1526-39 (1991); cf Wechsler, supra
note 20, at 19 (stressing that courts are obliged to be "entirely principled" in reviewing the actions of the other branches).
225. See In re Charge of Judicial Misconduct or Disability, Nos. 94-8 & 94-9 (D.C.
Cir. Dec. 30, 1994).
226. See In re Charge of Judicial Misconduct or Disability, 85 F.3d 701 (D.C. Cir.
Judicial Council 1996).
227. Judicial councils, rather than district or circuit courts, adjudicate charges of
judicial misconduct or disability, see 28 U.S.C. § 372(c) (1994), and consist of judges
from both the trial and appellate courts. See id. § 332. The full Judicial Council
reviews the initial decisions of the Chief Judge of the particular circuit. See id. §
372(c).
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pounded the difficulties.
The Judicial Council's affirmance of Judge Edwards's opinion
reflects a gross insensitivity to a rather obvious appearance of
impropriety on the part of Judge Sentelle (assuming, as did
Judge Edwards and the Judicial Council, that the allegations
were true). This fact was not lost on two judges serving on the
Judicial Council; both Judges Tatel and Kessler dissented on
this point.22 Judges Tatel and Kessler opined that, assuming
the charges to be true, Judge Sentelle's behavior raised a serious
ethical question. Moreover, if Judge Sentelle's meeting with Senators Helms and Faircloth was an unavoidable consequence of
appointing independent counsels under the Ethics in Government Act, "it would raise fresh questions regarding the constitutionality of the Independent Counsel provisions of the Ethics in
Government Act."2 With all due respect to Judge Edwards
and his colleagues on the Judicial Council, Judges Tatel and
Kessler appear to have the better argument.
Republican senators-including Senators Helms and
Faircloth-have used the Whitewater investigation as a potential means of discrediting, and perhaps disgracing, President
and Mrs. Clinton."' It is difficult to understand how one can
justify the presence of an Article III judge at the center of this
distinctively partisan maelstrom."
228. See Charge of Judicial Misconduct, Nos. 94-8 & 94-9, slip op. at 4-9 (Tatel &
Kessler, JJ., each writing separately). Both judges also disagreed with Judge
Edwards's holding that the Judicial Council for the District of Columbia Circuit had
jurisdiction over the complaints. See id. (Tatel & Kessler, JJ., each writing separately). However, they also reached the merits of the legal question of whether ex parte
meetings with members of Congress threatened to impede the execution of core Article III duties. See id. (Tatel & Kessler, JJ., each writing separately).
229. Id. at 4 (Tatel, J., writing separately).
230. See Paul Richter, Armey Cites 'Politics" of Whitewater, L-A TIMES, Apr. 19,
1996, at A9 (quoting House Majority Leader Dick Armey as describing the
Whitewater hearings as part and parcel of the "bloodsport" of politics and as a justified response to a "very mean" Democratic Party); see also Locy & Thompson, supra
note 201, at A3 (citing Senator Faircloth's belief that all of the facts regarding President Clinton's involvement in the Whitewater scandal had not yet come out); Schneider, supra note 14, at A21 (describing the partisan fight over the removal of special
counsel Robert Fiske).
231. As Judge Kessler noted in his separate statement accompanying the full Judicial Council's affirmance of Judge Edwards's opinion, judges "cannot stand impartially above the fray as we adjudicate and squarely in the midst of the fray as we
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If, as Judge Edwards argued and a majority of his colleagues
on the Judicial Council agreed, service on the Special Division
requires Article Ill judges to play an overtly political role, it is
time to reconsider the constitutionality of permitting Article III
judges to serve on the Special Division. Litigants appearing before Judge Sentelle have good cause to question his impartiality,
particularly in cases involving disputes between the legislative
and executive branches.
Perhaps, as Judge Edwards suggested, the general public is
politically "naive,"232 and should not expect those serving as
Article III judges to maintain both the reality and appearance of
impartiality and nonpartisanship. Be that as it may, the legitimacy of the third branch rests in no small part on the public's
acceptance of Article III judges as neutral adjudicators, rather
than political players.' Because Judge Sentelle's actions have
undermined public confidence in the institutional integrity of Article III courts, they should not be tolerated.'
carry out our non-adjudicatory Article H functions." Charge of Judicial Misconduct,
Nos. 94-8 & 94-9, slip op. at 8 (Kessler, J., writing separately) (arguing that the
broad consultative powers embraced by the majority incident to the appointment of
an independent counsel threaten the impartiality and independence of Article III
personnel).
232. See In re Charge of Judicial Misconduct or Disability, 39 F.3d 374, 382 (D.C.
Cir. Judicial Council), affd, Nos. 94-8 & 94-9 (D.C. Cir. Dec. 30, 1994).
233. See Wechsler, supra note 20, at 5-8 (arguing that courts should decide every
case based only on the facts before them and the Constitution); see also BICKEL, supra note 20, at 16-34 (discussing the judiciary's countermajoritarian role); cf
TUSHNET, supra note 75, at 4-5, 51-69 (arguing that constitutional adjudication is an
inherently political task involving rather naked forms of policy-making and positing
that attempts to legitimize judicial review through grand theories are doomed to failure).
234. Professor Stephen Carter has argued persuasively that the public's perception
of the legitimacy of the Constitution's allocation of powers among the three branches
of government-and hence the very structure of the government itself-plays a significant role in maintaining the legitimacy of the current arrangements. See Stephen
L. Carter, Constitutional Improprieties: Reflections on Mistretta, Morrison, and Administrative Government, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 357, 366-71 (1990). Moreover, the views
of the public matter even if they are unsophisticated or partially erroneous, "for legitimacy in a democratic polity begins with the ruler's recognition that the people
need not be smart in order to matter." Id. at 371. Thus, in the context of constitutional interpretation, Carter argues that a reading of the structural separation of
powers provisions that "disregards [the] popular constitutional hermeneutic expectation [regarding the meaning of these clauses] lacks legitimacy in a liberal democratic
polity." Id. at 367. Under this theory of the separation of powers, Judge Edwards
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Whether or not Judge Sentelle's "power lunch" and other ex
parte contacts were consistent with his duties imposed by the
independent counsel provisions of the Ethics in Government
Act,"5 they plainly diminished Judge Sentelle's credibility, and
hence his effectiveness as an Article III judge. Furthermore, the
Judicial Council's attempt to whitewash this partisan behavior
reflects an obliviousness to such behavior's effect on the public's
perception of Judge Sentelle-not to mention the effect of Judge
Edwards's opinion on the public's perception of the D.C. Circuit." 6 If Morrison means that our federal judges are free to
sip martinis with members of Congress incident to the exercise
of the appointments power, then Morrison must be abandoned.
III. AN ARGUMENT FOR JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE

A. Textual Justificationsfor Judicial Independence
The Constitution speaks, albeit indirectly, to the question of
and his colleagues missed the point in suggesting that those who object to judges
exercising political power in a political way-through an "old-boy network," for example-are simply wrong in their thinking. It is not for the judges, but rather it is for
the public, to decide and define the parameters of acceptable judicial behavior. Derogations from the citizenry's expectations of the federal judiciary's proper constitutional role will come at the price of the Third Branch's institutional legitimacy. See id.
at 366-71.
235. 28 U.S.C. §§ 591-599 (1994).
236. See Judges Err on Whitewater, supra note 14, at A26 (noting that Judge
Edwards's opinion tends to diminish the public's confidence in the judiciary); Locy,
supra note 206, at A9 (accusing Judge Edwards of disregarding the public's perception); see also Carter, supra note 234, at 364-84 (suggesting that courts should engage in a "dialogue" with the public rather than isolate themselves from public reaction). A colleague has suggested that Judge Edwards's opinion could be construed as
a clever argument in favor of abolishing the Special Division, i.e., if participation on
the Special Division requires the political entanglement of Article III judges, then
the public will demand that federal judges not serve on the Special Division. This is
certainly a plausible interpretation of the opinion. If this were, in fact, Judge
Edwards's intention, I am quite sympathetic to his project. Neither the general public nor the organized bar, however, took this message from the decision. See Locy,
supra note 206, at A9. Instead, both the public and the bar expressed shock and
disappointment regarding a decision that seems largely indifferent to extrajudicial
participation in blatantly partisan activities. See id. Moreover, the opinion did not
even once directly criticize Congress's decision to mandate judicial participation on
the Special Division. Cf. United States v. Then, 56 F.3d 464, 466-67 & n.1 (2d Cir.
1995) (Calabresi, J., concurring) (arguing that the federal courts should engage in a
dialogue with Congress regarding the protection of constitutional liberties).
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judicial independence. Article III provides that "The Judges, both
of the supreme and inferior Courts, shall hold their Offices during good Behavior, and shall, at stated Times, receive for their
Services, a Compensation, which shall not be diminished during
their Continuance in Office." 7 The reason the Framers included such a clause seems obvious: they intended for federal judges
to remain free from the rough-and-tumble of political life." 8
Life tenure, coupled with a salary that cannot be decreased
during active service, ensures that judicial personnel can undertake their duties without fear of demotion or financial hardship.
Of course, the ability of presidents to dangle promotions before
district and circuit judges, and the possibility of facing a Senate
confirmation vote constitute possible sources of partisan consciousness. Nevertheless, the Article III protections provide significant insulation for federal judges; they need not worry about
being directly responsive to political agents, whether from the
executive or legislative branches of government. 9 Significantly, this interpretation of the Tenure and Compensation Clauses
finds strong support in both the debates at the Federal Convention of 1787 and in the Federalist Papers.
1. The Debates at the Federal-Conventionof 1787
The debates at the Federal Convention of 1787 strongly support the link between judicial independence and Article IIIs
Tenure and Compensation Clauses. On two separate occasions,
the delegates took up the question of judicial independence. Both
debates demonstrate that the Framers held a strong conviction
that federal judges had to maintain their independence from
both "political" branches.
On Wednesday, July 18, 1787, the Convention considered the
method of appointing judges and the means by which to secure
their independence from the other two branches of the federal
237. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
238. See generally Murchison, supra note 170, at 998-1000 (noting that justices
were intended to be "statesmen" who were "above politics").
239. See Richard A. Epstein, The Independence of Judges: The Uses and Limitations
of Public Choice Theory, 1990 BYU L. REV. 827, 845; Judith Resnik, The Mythic
Meaning of Article III Courts, 56 U. COLO. L. REV. 581, 612-13 (1985); see also infra
note 302 and accompanying text (discussing judicial independence).
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government. 0 Initially, the Article III Compensation Clause
provided that federal judges' salaries would neither decrease nor
increase."4 Gouverneur Morris of Pennsylvania moved to
strike the words "or increase" from the draft, because "the Legislature ought to be at liberty to increase salaries as circumstances might require, and that this would not create any improper
dependence in the Judges." 2
Although several members of the Convention, including Benjamin Franklin, favored the motion, James Madison opposed it." s
Madison argued that "[tihe dependence will be less if the increase
alone should be permitted, but it will be improper even so far to
permit a dependence."' Because Congress would hold the power to grant raises, "an undue complaisance in the former [the
judiciary] may be felt towards the latter [the Congress]. " 245 Notwithstanding Madison's objections, the motion carried by a vote
of six to two." s Madison still believed, however, that judicial
salaries should be fixed at the time of appointment."
On Monday, August 27, 1787, the Convention again took up
the question of protecting the independence of the federal 'judiciary. 4 The delegates considered and rejected a motion by
John Dickinson of Delaware to add the words "provided that
they may be removed by the Executive on the application by the
Senate and House of Representatives" after the words "good
behavior."2 49 Elbridge Gerry of Massachusetts seconded the

240. See 2 MAX FARRAND, THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at
37-38, 42-45 (2d ed. 1937); 2 JAMES MADISON, THE DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 WHICH FRAMED THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF

AMERICA 274-78 (Gaillard Hunt & James Brown Scott eds., 1987) (1787).
241. See 2 MADISON, supra note 240, at 277.
242. Id.

243. Id. at 277-78.
244. Id. at 278 (emphasis added); cf. William Terrel Hodges, Gerald Bard Toflat: A
Trial Judge at Heart, 44 DUKE L.J. 995, 995 (1995) (reporting that in the 1970s,
Congress refused to grant the federal judiciary any meaningful salary increases "despite spiraling inflation").
245. 2 MADISON, supra note 240, at 278.
246. See id.
247. See infra text accompanying note 256.
248. See 2 MADISON, supra note 240, at 474.
249. Id.; 2 FARRAND, supra note 240, at 428.
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motion."0 Gouverneur Morris opposed the proposal because "it
was fundamentally wrong to subject Judges to so arbitrary an
authority.""' Edmund Randolph of Virginia concurred in this
view, arguing that the proposal "weaken[ed] too much the independence of the Judges.""2 The proposal failed on a vote of one
to seven. s 3
Immediately after protecting the federal judiciary from removal outside of the impeachment process, James Madison moved to
reinstate the words "increased or" before the word "diminished"
in the Compensation Clause.' After a very brief debate, the
Convention rejected the proposal by a vote of one to five. 5
The 1787 Federal Convention debates regarding the Compensation Clause plainly indicate that the Framers considered the
institutional independence of the federal judiciary to be critically
important. Indeed, Madison felt so strongly about this issue
that, out of an abundance of caution, he would have precluded
any increase in federal judges' remuneration. Moreover, the delegates rejected a provision that would have permitted the President and Congress to remove troublesome federal judges without
requiring resort to the formal impeachment process. Together,
these actions demonstrate the Framers' commitment to maintaining the independence, and hence the integrity, of the judicial
branch.
2. The FederalistPapers
The Federalist Papers also consider the question of judicial
independence and speak to the question of partisan judging
more directly. Three Federalist essays (FederalistNos. 37, 78,
and 79) demonstrate that the Framers intended to safeguard
zealously the independence of the federal judiciary.
In FederalistNo. 37, Madison defended the Constitution's conferral of life tenure under the Good Behaviour Clause. Citing

250. See 2 MADISON, supra note 240, at 473.
251. Id.

252. Id. at 474.
253. See id
254. See id.
255. See id.
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Montesquieu, Madison argued that "[w]ere the power of judging
joined with the legislative, the life and liberty of the subject
would be exposed to arbitrary control, for the judge would then
be the legislator.Were it joined to the executive power, the judge
5
might behave with all the violence of an oppressor.""
In FederalistNo. 78, Alexander Hamilton elaborated upon this
theme.25 7 Taking up where Madison left off, Hamilton argued
that independence is essential to the proper functioning of the
judiciary: the judiciary is to serve as a check on legislative and
executive caprice; it cannot perform this role if its personnel are
beholden to either of these branches. 2S "[I]t is the best expedient which can be devised in any government, to secure a steady,
upright, and impartial administration of the laws. " s Hamilton
emphasized that "[tihe complete independence of the courts of
justice is peculiarly essential in a limited constitution."26 °
Indeed, under Hamilton's view constitutionalism itself requires the existence of an independent and impartial judiciary to
safeguard constitutional guarantees in practice; "[without this,
all the reservations of particular rights or privileges would
amount to nothing."2 6 ' Tenure in office, with the resulting independence of mind and spirit, 2is62essential to securing an independent and impartial judiciary.
In FederalistNo. 79, Hamilton continued his exposition on the
necessity of an independent and impartial judiciary, this time
turning his attention to the Compensation Clause. "Next to per

256. THE FEDERALIST NO. 37, at 373, 376 (James Madison) (John Hamilton ed.,
1866); see also BARON DE MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRIT OF THE LAWS 151-52 (Thomas

Nungent trans., Hafner Publ'g Co. 1966) (1748).
257. See THE FEDERALIST No. 78, supra note 51.

258. Hamilton wrote that:
The standard of good behaviour for the continuance in office of the judicial magistracy, is certainly one of the most valuable of the modern improvements in the practice of government. In a monarchy, it is an excellent barrier to the despotism of the prince: in a republic, it is a no less
excellent barrier to the encroachments and oppressions of the representative body.
Id. at 575.
259. Id.
260. Id. at 576.
261. Id. at 577.
262. See id. at 576-82.
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manency in office, nothing can contribute more to the indepen263
dence of the judges, than a fixed provision for their support."
According to Hamilton, "[iun the general course of human nature, a power over a man's subsistence amounts to a power over
"
Judges dependent upon the good graces of Conhis will.2"
gress for their pay could not act independently of Congress. Accordingly, it was necessary constitutionally to protect the judges'
remuneration. Hamilton explained that:
This provision for the support of the judges bears every
mark of prudence and efficacy; and it may be safely affirmed
that, together with the permanent tenure of their offices, it
affords a better prospect of their independence than is discoverable in the constitutions of any of the states, in regard to
their own judges.2"
In this phrase, Hamilton made explicit what was only implicit in
Article III: the Good Behaviour and Compensation Clauses exist
to ensure that federal judges may execute their duties free and
clear of untoward political entanglements with either the President or the Congress.
3. Implementing the Framers'Model
Given the textual mandate for an impartial and independent
judiciary and the Framers' understanding of this mandate, it is
plain that federal judges have an obligation to avoid entanglements that would compromise their independence or impartiality. However, events leading to the appointment of Kenneth
Starr as the Whitewater independent counsel and the apparent
willingness of federal Sentencing Commissioners/judges to sit in
judgment over the legality of their own legislative work product
seem inconsistent with the Framers' designs for a neutral and
impartial federal judiciary.
If the judges of the lower federal courts are either unwilling or
unable to maintain the appearance of nonpartisan impartiality,

263. Id. No. 79, at 583.
264. Id.
265. Id. at 585.
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then the Supreme Court must curtail their participation in activities that diminish both the credibility of individual jurists
(i.e., Judge Sentelle) and the entire third branch. Article III
should be construed to prohibit the embrace of a loose form of
functionalism-a kind of functionalism that permits federal
judges to undertake duties that compromise their impartiality
and independence; a kind of functionalism that requires judicial
personnel to be directly politically accountable to the public for
their actions."c
B. History, Prudence, and JudicialIndependence
Notwithstanding Madison's and Hamilton's insistence on an
impartial and politically independent federal judiciary, early
justices demonstrated a willingness-if not an eagerness-to
play an active role within the political branches of government.
There are a number of rather (in)famous examples of justices
serving in such dual capacities."1 However, there also has
been a clear historical trend against federal judges undertaking
extrajudicial duties. As will be demonstrated below, on balance,
the historical counterexamples do not present a compelling case
against the argument in favor of prohibiting judicial personnel
from undertaking tasks traditionally associated with the executive and legislative branches.
1. A Brief Overview of Federal Judges' Participation in
ExtrajudicialRoles
Since the earliest days of the Republic, presidents and the
Congress have attempted to enlist the aid of federal judges in
executing their constitutional duties. For example, Chief Justices Jay and Ellsworth held diplomatic posts in the Adams Administration,s and John Marshall served as both Secretary of

266. See generally Carter, supra note 234, at 366-71 (discussing the need for con-

stitutional interpreters to recognize that popular consent to judicial decision making
occurs because of a public belief in structural continuity); Redish & Cisar, supra
note 4, at 449-56, 474-78 (discussing the dangers posed by a functional analysis in
the separation of powers context and advocating a "pragmatic formalism" approach).
267. See infra text accompanying notes 272-88.
268. See Calabresi & Larsen, supra note 54, at 1131-32.
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State and Chief Justice from January 27, 1801 to March 4,
1801.269 The early Congresses and Administrations also indicated their approval of simultaneous executive posts for judges
by statutorily assigning potentially controversial executive functions to the Chief Justice." 270
These dual postings were not accepted universally, and, in
fact, were denounced by some. Thomas Jefferson, for example,
believed that the practice of dual appointments precluded the
federal judiciary from carrying out its duties in an impartial and
independent manner.2 71
Nevertheless, judicial personnel continued to accept executive

branch commissions

well into the nineteenth century.

"[I]nstances of extrajudicial service in executive office continued,
but, with one notorious exception, the service was in significant-

ly less controversial and important posts." 27 2 The infamous
Hayes-Tilden Commission, comprised of five sitting justices, pro-

269. See id. at 1131 n.423. As Calabresi and Larsen point out, Chief Justice Marshall signed, but failed to deliver, William Marbury's commission to serve as a justice of the peace in the District of Columbia. See id. This commission formed the
basis of the dispute in Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
270. Calabresi & Larsen, supra note 54, at 1133. This practice of dual service in
more than one branch was not particularly novel. Modeled on Great Britain's parliamentary system, pre-Revolutionary, colonial governments often lacked a separation of
powers among the executive, legislative, and judicial functions. For example, in colonial Virginia, the Council of State served as the Royal Governor's cabinet, the second (upper) house of the legislature, and the highest colonial court. See THOMAS JEFFERSON, NOTES ON THE STATE OF VIRGINIA (1787), reprinted in THE PORTABLE THOMAS JEFFERSON 161 (Merrill D. Peterson ed., 1975); BAILYN, supra note 67, at 175-98;
see also ACKERMAN, supra note 181, at 67-76 (discussing the evolving roles of the
executive, legislative, and judicial branches over time). On the one hand, post-Revolutionary state constitutions generally separated executive, legislative, and judicial
functions, see JEFFERSON, supra, at 226-27, 229, although the notion of holding dual
judicial/executive or judicial/legislative appointments was not completely foreign to
the Framers' generation. On the other hand, it is more difficult to divine why early
federal judges sought out (or at least did not decline) dual postings. Perhaps, as
with the relatively contemporary case of Associate Justice Abe Fortas, it was simply
boredom with judicial duties. See BRUCE ALLEN MURPHY, FORTAS: THE RISE AND
RUIN OF A SUPREME COURT JUSTICE 187, 191-93 (1988).
271. See Calabresi & Larsen, supra note 54, at 1134. Jefferson believed that the
executive's practice of bestowing offices on federal judges made them "auxiliary to
the Executive in all it views, instead of forming a balance between that [branch]
and the Legislature." Id.; 1 CHARLES WARREN, THE SUPREME COURT IN UNITED
STATES HISTORY 167 (1922).
272. Calabresi & Larsen, supra note 54, at 1135.
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vides the "notorious" exception to the general trend of relatively
noncontroversial extrajudicial service.273 Other joint appointments during this period were less noxious. For example, Justice
Samuel Nelson represented the United States in an arbitration
proceeding involving the British government.274 Justices also
served on a number of panels and arbitrations, often involving
border disputes." 5
In the twentieth century, Justice Robert Jackson served as
the United States' prosecutor at Nuremburg.276 This service
was controversial not only because a sitting justice assumed an
executive branch post, but also because it caused substantial
practical difficulties for the Supreme Court; the Justices divided
four to four in a number of cases and Justice Jackson's vote was
needed to resolve these deadlocks.277
In 1963, Chief Justice Earl Warren agreed to serve as the
head of the commission charged with investigating the assassination of President Kennedy.27 Although Chief Justice Warren
initially declined the assignment, he ultimately agreed to serve,
notwithstanding his serious misgivings about doing so.279 Chief

273. See id. at 1135-36. This Commission approved a political arrangement whereby
Rutherford B. Hayes would become President in return for the end of congressional
Reconstruction in the South. See id.
274. See Jane A. Restani & Ira Bloom, The Quick Solution to Complex Problems:
The Article III Judge, 18 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 1668, 1669 (1995).
275. See id. at 1670; Calabresi & Larsen, supra note 54, at 1136 n.449.
276. See Restani & Bloom, supra note 274, at 1669; Alpheus Thomas Mason, ExtraJudicial Work for Judges: The Views of Chief Justice Stone, 67 HARV. L. REV. 193,
209-14 (1954).
277. See Mason, supra note 276, at 212-13. Some of these cases were "of such importance as to raise the question whether they should be heard with an eight-judge
court." Id. at 212 n.58. One case, Atkins v. Atkins, 326 U.S. 683 (1945), presented
the specter of the Supreme Court overruling one of its prior precedents, Williams v.
North Carolina, 325 U.S. 226 (1945), by an equally divided vote affirming a conflicting opinion by the court of appeals. See Mason, supra note 276, at 212-13.
278. See CHIEF JUSTICE EARL WARREN, THE MEMOIRS OF EARL WARREN 356-58 (1977).
279. In his autobiography, Chief Justice Warren explained his misgivings this way:
First, it is not in the spirit of constitutional separation of powers to have
a member of the Supreme Court serve on a presidential commission;
second, it would distract a Justice from the work of the Court, which
had a heavy docket; and, third, it was impossible to foresee what litigation such a commission might spawn, with resulting disqualification of
the Justice from sitting in such cases. I then told them that, historically,
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Justice Warrens acceptance of the appointment, however, did
not allay or assuage his constitutional and prudential concerns
about undertaking this extrajudicial assignment.8 0
Finally, former Justice Abe Fortas's excessive entanglement
with the Johnson Administration provides the most recent example of broad-based judicial participation in executive branch
policy making. Justice Fortas, while a sitting justice, assisted
President Johnson in a number of ways, including drafting
speeches and legislation. 1 Fortas also advised the President
on the Vietnam War, an issue that came before the Court in a
variety of contexts. 2 As with many of the earlier historical antecedents of such behavior by a sitting Justice, no good came of
this arrangement. 2" In fact, the entire federal judiciary unquestionably suffered a collective black eye as a result of Justice
Fortas's extrajudicial escapades within the executive branch.

the acceptance of diplomatic posts by Chief Justices Jay and Ellsworth,
had not contributed to the welfare of the Court, that the service of five
Justices on the Hayes-Tilden Commission had demeaned it, that the
appointment of Justice Roberts as chairman to investigate the Pearl
.Harbor disaster had served no good purpose, and that the action of Justice Robert Jackson in leaving Court for a year to become chief prosecutor at Nirnberg after World War H had resulted in divisiveness and
internal bitterness on the Court.
Id. at 356.
Notwithstanding these prudential and institutional objections, Chief Justice Warren accepted the appointment after President Johnson made repeated (and successful) appeals to the Chief Justice's sense of duty and patriotism-simply put, LBJ
used emotionally powerful arguments to overcome the Chief Justice's reluctance to
accept the posting. See id. at 356-58; see also LYNDON B. JOHNSON, THE VANTAGE
POINT 26-27 (1971) (discussing the meeting at which Chief Justice Warren agreed to
chair the commission).
280. See Calabresi & Larsen, supra note 54, at 1137.
281. See LAURA KALMAN, ABE FORTAS: A BIOGRAPHY 293-320, 351 (1990) (describing
the unusually close relationship between Justice Fortas and President Johnson);
MURPHY, supra note 270, at 234-68, 378-406, 487-89 (discussing the Fortas-Johnson
relationship); ROBERT SHOGAN, A QUESTION OF JUDGMENT: THE FORTAS CASE AND
THE STRUGGLE FOR THE SUPREME COURT 118-42 (1972) (examining issues related to
the same relationship).
282. See generally KALMAN, supra note 281, at 282-90 (describing the inconsistencies in Justice Fortas's civil rights opinions and his later opinions on free speech
and the Vietnam War).
283. See generally MURPHY, supra note 270, at 378-440 (describing in complete detail the spectacle of the first nominee for Chief Justice to be questioned in person
by the Senate Judiciary Committee).
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Ultimately, his service as an advisor to President Johnson, in
conjunction with some ethically suspect consulting arrangements, led to Justice Fortas's forced resignation from the
Court.2 Justice Fortas's story serves as a strong warning
against judicial participation in executive or legislative policymaking roles.
2. The Limited Lessons of History
The historical examples set forth above might lead one to conclude that extrajudicial service has the sanction of history, if not
of the Constitution's text or of the Framers' intent. For the reasons set forth below, this conclusion should be rejected. Notwithstanding the sporadic historical practice of federal judges serving
in executive capacities, the practice never has been universally
accepted. Far from it: "Whatever the reason for the silence of the
constitutional text on this subject, Americans have, from the
beginning, debated the wisdom of the simultaneous holding of
judicial and executive offices."' Although the federal courts
have attempted to draw a distinction between the "personal" activities of Article III judges and their "official" Article III duties,
the public never has embraced such a view. 6
Moreover, for almost two hundred years, concurrent service as
both an Article III judge and as a member of the President's
cabinet, subcabinet, or the ambassadorial ranks has not been
constitutionally tolerable as a matter of practice and tradition.287 As Professor Stephen Calabresi has observed, "it is fair
to say that a tradition has evolved that very nearly replicates
the situation that would exist if [the Constitution contained] a
judicial-executive incompatibility clause."'
Members of the Supreme Court also have voiced strong objections to interbranch entanglements, including service in the executive branch. For example, former Chief Justice Harlan Fiske

284. See KALMAN, supra note 281, at 370-76.
285. Calabresi & Larsen, supra note 54, at 1131.
286. See id. at 1132 & nn.430-31, 1141-46, 1143 n.493. The views of the public on
this question are far from irrelevant. See Carter, supra note 234, at 367-69.
287. See Calabresi & Larsen, supra note 54, at 1139.
288. Id.
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Stone repeatedly declined invitations to participate in executive
branch policy-making functions. 89 In rejecting a proposed presidential appointment to become "Rubber Czar"2 ° in 1942, Chief
Justice Stone emphasized "the generally recognized consideration that it is highly undesirable for a judge to engage actively
in public or private undertakings other than the performance of
his judicial functions. " 91 Public reaction to this refusal was
strongly favorable. 2
Refusing yet another proffered executive posting, that of War
Ballot Commissioner,2 9 . Chief Justice Stone reiterated that "I
regard the performance of such a function as incompatible with
obligations which I assumed with the office of Chief Justice and
as likely to injure my usefulness in that office."' He explained
that "action taken by the Chief Justice in connection with the
administration of the proposed legislation might become subject
to review in the Court over which he presides and that it might
have political implications and political consequences which
should be wholly dissociated from the duties of the judicial office. "
Thus, as a prudential matter, Chief Justice Stone avoided any
direct involvement in an executive function that might have
nontrivial policy-making implications. Such a role was, in his
view, inimical to the execution of his duties as an Article III

289. See Mason, supra note 276, at 200-01.
290. Rubber was a scarce commodity during World War II, and it was therefore
necessary to have a government official charged with ensuring the maintenance of
an adequate supply. Because of the civilian uses for rubber-based products (i.e., automobile tires), the allocation of this commodity was particularly important. See DAviD NovIcK ET AL., WARTIME PRODUCTION CONTROLS 225-26 (1949).
291. Mason, supra note 276, at 203 (quoting Letter from Chief Justice Harlan F.
Stone to President Franklin Delano Roosevelt (July 20, 1942)).
292. See id. at 205. Editorial writers praised the Chief Justice's "'blunt' refusal,"
emphasizing that such action was consistent with maintaining the "honor" of the
Supreme Court and that it avoided "detract[ing] from the dignity of the Court." Id.
293. The War Ballot Commissioner was to supervise overseas soldiers' participation
in the balloting for federal offices in the 1944 elections. See Norman Silber &
Geoffrey Miller, Toward 'Neutral Principles" in the Law: Selections from the Oral
History of Herbert Wechsler, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 854, 880 (1993).
294. Mason, supra note 276, at 208 (quoting letter from Chief Justice Harlan F.
Stone to Senator Arthur H. Vandenberg (Nov. 22, 1943)).
295. Id.; cf MURPHY, supra note 270, at 234-68 (describing Associate Justice Abe
Fortas's close ties with the Johnson White House).
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judge. The judicial role required neutrality with respect to both
the particular subject matter at hand and the particular litigant
before the court. Executive branch postings potentially compromised a judge in both respects: it could give the judge an interest in the outcome of the dispute and/or create the appearance of
a connection between the executive branch and the judge. For
Chief Justice Stone, avoidance of dual postings constituted a
kind of prophylactic safeguard that preserved his ability to serve
as a neutral adjudicator."'
In sum, it would be too facile to assert that history endorses
Article III judges undertaking responsibilities traditionally associated with either the legislative or executive branch. Instead,
the clear rule, with only occasional exceptions, has been careful
separation of the judicial function from the political branches, in
order to protect the independence and neutrality-and hence the
legitimacy-of both Article III decisionmakers and their decisions.297
IV. THE COMPELLING NEED FOR GOOD FENCES: A LIMITED
DEFENSE OF FORMALISM IN SEPARATION OF POWERS ANALYSES

A. Defining the JudicialRole
Robert Frost wrote that "good fences make good neighbors."298 It should also be said that good fences make for good

296. See Mason, supra note 276, at 208.
297. Cf Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 851 (1986)

(discussing the factors that the Court uses to determine when a congressional decision to authorize the adjudication of Article III business in a non-Article III tribunal
impermissibly threatens judicial branch integrity). Of course, politicians look to
judges to resolve difficult problems precisely because the public perceives them to be
neutral, honest brokers. This course of behavior is paradoxical, however. On the one
hand, judicial service in novel roles can be helpful because the citizenry perceives
federal judges to be "neutral." On the other hand, placing judges in extrajudicial
roles allows the political branches to threaten to destroy the very neutrality that led
them to look to the judiciary in the first place.
298. The verse is as follows:
My apple trees will never get across
And eat the cones under his pines, I tell him.
He only says, "Good fences make good neighbors."
Robert Frost, The Mending Wall (1914), reprinted in THE TREASURY OF AMERICAN
POETRY 342 (Nancy Sullivan ed., 1978); see also Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 115
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judges; the legitimacy of Article III courts depends, to a great
extent, on the willingness of the citizenry to acquiesce in the
decisions of the unelected judges who staff the federal
courts. 9 Such acquiescence will occur only if the Article III
courts are perceived as honest brokers between the myriad
groups and interests that come before them.0 0 If the public
ceases to perceive Article III judges as honest brokers, the game

is lost.30 '
Judge Irving Kaufman, who served as Chief Judge of the
United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, wrote an

S. Ct. 1447, 1463 (1995) (citing and applying this principle).
299. See BICKEL, supra note 20, at 16-33; Wechsler, supra note 20, at 2-20; see also
Carter, supra note 234, at 364-71 (arguing that the public's perception of the legitimacy of the Constitution's allocation of powers among the branches is significant in
maintaining the current arrangement); see generally Bowers v; Hardwick, 478 U.S.
186, 194-95 (1986) (arguing that the federal courts cannot undertake tasks beyond
the scope of their institutional, and constitutional, competence without losing their
popular legitimacy).
300. Cf MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 4(c)(2) (1990) (prohibiting judges from accepting any governmental position except one relating to the law, the legal system, or the administration of justice). Notwithstanding this provision, as noted supra Part II.B, Judge Edwards sanctioned ex parte'contacts between a member
of the Special Division and members of the Senate regarding the appointment of an
independent counsel. Regardless of the constitutional niceties, one reasonably could
argue that, as an ethical matter, federal judges should not serve as Sentencing Commissioners or as members of the Special Division if such service will, of necessity,
interfere with their credibility as Article III judges. See In re Charge of Judicial
Misconduct or Disability, Nos. 94-8 & 94-9, slip op. at 6 (D.C. Cir. Dec. 30, 1994)
(Tatel, J., writing separately) (arguing that if service on the Special Division threatens the public's confidence in the impartiality of federal judges, such service cannot
be deemed constitutional).
301. See Wechsler, supra note 20, at 9-10, 14-23 (arguing that principled, "neutral"
judicial decisions are essential if the federal courts are to plausibly deny claims of
bias); see also BICKEL, supra note 20, at 16-34 (discussing the countermajoritarian
difficulty faced by the Supreme Court and the importance of principled decision
making to successful judicial review); ELY, supra note 20, at 41, 44-72 (arguing that
theories of constitutional review based on natural law, neutral principles, reason,
tradition, and consensus are simply methods of allowing judges to use their own values in enforcing the Constitution and are, therefore, irreconcilable with the basic
democratic theory of American government). But see Delgado, supra note 182, at
1223-25 (discussing Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954), and the Supreme
Court's subsequent retreat from Brown's principles in City of Richmond v. J.A.
Croson, Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989)). Delgado argues that both cases demonstrate the
Supreme Court's ability to anticipate successfully and incorporate in its decisions
prevailing social trends and values. Id.
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insightful article about the practical justifications for judicial
independence. 0 2 In large part, the article argued against the
adoption of legislation that would authorize the removal of federal judges from active service through a process other than impeachment.0 3 Judge Kaufman's larger project, however, explains and defends an independent federal judiciary. After conducting an historical examination of the independence of judges
in Britain and the United States,0 4 Judge Kaufman turned to
the role of judicial independence in the Framers' scheme of separation of powers. 0 5 According to Judge Kaufman, "[tihe essence of judicial independence ... is the preservation of a separate institution of government that can adjudicate cases or controversies with impartiality."0 6
Although Article III's Tenure and Compensation Clauses provide textual support for the independence of federal judges,
"[Airticle IIrs protection of judicial independence extends beyond
the specific prohibitions of the salary and tenure provisions to
embrace all significant intrusions upon the exercise of the judicial power."0 7 Thus, the specific textual guarantees speak to a
larger purpose: the maintenance of an impartial and independent judicial branch of government.
Because the federal judiciary sometimes must decide interbranch disputes between the executive and legislative branches,

302. See Irving R. Kaufman, The Essence of Judicial Independence, 80 COLUM. L.
REV. 671 (1980). Three years later, Judge Kaufinan accepted the chairmanship of the
President's Commission on Organized Crime. See Exec. Order No. 12,435, 48 Fed.
Reg. 34, 723 (1983), revoked by 52 Fed. Reg. 36,901 (1987). This service led to litigation over the Commission's ability to subpoena documents. The Courts of Appeals
for both the Third the Eleventh Circuits greatly criticized the participation of federal
judges in this enterprise. See In re President's Comm'n of Organized Crime Subpoena of Scarfo, 783 F.2d 370, 377-79 (3d Cir. 1986); In re President's Comm'n on Organized Crime Subpoena of Scaduto, 763 F.2d 1191, 1197-98 (11th Cir. 1985). It is
ironic that Judge -Kaufnan, after writing passionately about the need for judges to
avoid the hurly-burly of politics, would accept such a position from the President.
303. See Kaufman, supra note 302, at 671-72; see also U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl.
5; § 3, cl. 6 (giving the House of Representatives the power to impeach and the Senate the power to try the impeachment).
304. See Kaufinan, supra note 302, at 672-87 (tracing the historical evolution of
judicial independence).
305. See id. at 687-700.
306. Id. at 688.
307. Id.
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it has a special obligation to avoid the appearance of aligning
itself with one branch or the other. It must be an honest broker
between Congress and the President. 8 '
A federal judge also must be generally disinterested in the
disputes that come before her.
[A] statute that gives the judge, even unintentionally, a personal stake in the controversy before [her] would not only
implicate the personal rights of the disadvantaged party, but
would also run afoul of the constitutional command that the
ultimate power of decision, the judicial power of the United
States, remain in the third branch.3"
Simply put, neither Congress nor the President can act "to compromise the impartiality of the judge."3 1 °
Judge Kaufman concluded by arguing that these two policy
considerations mandate the adoption of a prophylactic rule
against placing judges in roles in which they must "take sides"
or in which they will have a direct interest in the outcome of a
dispute that they must decide.3"1' "Even relatively minor and
remote threats to impartial decision making should not survive
constitutional objection if they do not enhance substantial government interests. " 3 ' Furthermore, "if alternative means of
achieving the same ends without compromising the judiciary are
available, the 'necessity' of the challenged policy is open to serious question." 3 Thus, if it is possible to avoid compromising
the impartiality of judges, the political branches of government
should not be permitted to establish an administrative scheme
that arguably endangers that impartiality and, hence, the independence and legitimacy of Article HI judges.1 4

308.
309.
310.
311.

See id.
Id. at 693.
Id.
See id. at 697.

312. Id.
313. Id.
314. The recent controversy over District Judge Harold Baer's ruling to suppress 80
pounds of cocaine and heroin-a ruling that he later reversed-illustrates the fragility of the Article HI courts and the effects of giving a judge a personal or professional stake in a decision. See United States v. Bayless, 913 F. Supp. 232 (S.D.N.Y.),
vacated, 921 F. Supp. 211 (S.D.N.Y. 1996); see also Nat Hentoff, Judges in the Dock,
WASH. PoST, Apr. 13, 1996, at A21 (discussing the implications for judicial indepen-
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B. A Neo-Formalist Response to Functional Problems with
Delegations of Nonjudicial Duties to Article III Judges
Applying Judge Kaufman's analytical framework, the behavior
31
of federal judges in the aftermath of both Mistretta
and
6
1
7
Morrison" is highly problematic.
Turning first to
Mistretta, the failure of federal Sentencing Commissioners/judges to recuse themselves from deciding the legality of
their own work product"'5 plainly runs afoul of Judge
Kaufman's admonition." 9 As the architect of a particular rule,
a Sentencing Commissioner has a personal stake in the outcome
of a challenge to that rule or to the system as a whole. If the
SRA calls for judges to pass judgment on their own work product, then it cannot be constitutional. 2 Of course, the difficulty
could be resolved easily by requiring the recusal of Sentencing
Commissioners in any guidelines case that requires more than
routine application of the rules. In any case involving a challenge to the validity or legality of a particular rule, a Sentencing
Commissioner should be ineligible to sit.
With respect to Morrison and Judge Edwards's opinion in In
re Charge of Judicial Misconduct or Disability,2 ' it is clear
that, as interpreted, the independent counsel provisions of the
Ethics in Government Act compromise the appearance of federal

dence based on the presidential candidates' extreme reactions to the Baer controversy); Don Van Natta, Jr., Judges Defend a Colleague from Attacks, N.Y. TIMES, Mar.
29, 1996, at BI (discussing the statement issued by four judges of the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit that criticized attacks on Judge Baer because of the
threat that these political attacks posed to judicial independence).
315. Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361 (1989).
316. Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654 (1988).
317. Indeed, several prominent legal academics strongly criticized Mistretta and
Morrison-even before the lower federal courts began to apply those decisions in
novel ways. See, e.g., Carter, supra note 234, at 358-64. The subsequent behavior of
the lower federal courts amply demonstrates that the concerns of these commentatos were justified. See Redish & Cisar, supra note 4, at 475-78, 490.
318. See Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 406.
319. See supra notes 302-13 and accompanying text.
320. Cf. Kaufmann, supra note 302, at 697 (suggesting that even minor threats to
impartial decision making should be considered to be unconstitutional if "they do not
enhance a substantial government interest").
321. 39 F.3d 374 (D.C. Cir. Judicial Council), affd, Nos. 94-8 & 94-9 (D.C. Cir.
Dec. 30, 1994).
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judges' impartiality. According to the Judicial Council of the
District of Columbia Circuit, service on the Special Division
practically compels Article IH judges to become embroiled in
highly political matters of the day. 2
Consistent with Judge Kaufman's approach, federal judges
simply cannot accept such a role, because alternative means of
achieving the same objective are readily available.s" For example, the appointment of a special prosecutor by the Justice Department, coupled with Congress's power of impeachment, provides an ample means of securing independent and politically
unbiased prosecutors to investigate misconduct within the executive branch."2 Even if one posits the need for "independent

322. See generally Charge of Judicial Misconduct, 39 F.3d at 380-81 (stating that
Special Division appointees fall under U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, the power of appointment, and therefore may consult with political figures); In re Charge of Judicial Misconduct or Disability, 85 F.3d 701 (D.C. Cir. Judicial Council 1996) (holding that
possible contacts between a United States Senator and a member of the Special Division regarding the appointment of an independent counsel to investigate former
Commerce Secretary Ron Brown were not impermissible).
323. See Kaufman, supra note 302, at 697.
324. Indeed, fallout from the Watergate experience confirms, rather than refutes,
this assertion. When President Nixon ordered the firing of Special Prosecutor
Archibald Cox, the so-called "Saturday Night Massacre," public and congressional
reaction was swift and negative. See Frank Tuerkheimer, Watergate As History, 1990
WIS. L. REV. 1323, 1326-27 (describing Watergate's history and reviewing STANLEY I.
KUTLER, THE WARS OF WATERGATE (1990)). Politically, a President cannot discharge
a special prosecutor, nor can he appoint a political crony, given the increasingly
exacting nature of congressional oversight of such matters. Thus, there is really no
functional need for the appointment of "independent counsel" by a panel of federal
judges. See Steven G. Calabresi, Some Normative Arguments for the Unitary Executive, 48 ARK. L. REV. 23, 90-95 (1995) (arguing that the Ethics in Government Act
unnecessarily politicizes the investigative process and is not needed to ensure impartial investigations of wrongdoing in the Executive Branch); see also Morrison v.
Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 697, 705-07 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (stating that the independent counsel provisions of the Ethics in Government Act practically require the
Attorney General to appoint an independent counsel when requested by Congress,
thus contravening the executive power). But cf Lawrence Lessig & Cass R. Sunstein,
The President and the Administration, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 14-22 (1994) (arguing
that executive power is not the exclusive domain of presidential power because there
was no original hierarchical department of legal affairs, no general or central body
for federal prosecution, and no rule that prosecution be conducted by the President
or those answerable to him); Carl Levin, The Independent Counsel Statute: A Matter
of Public Confidence and Constitutional Balance, 16 HOFSTRA L. REV. 11, 17-22
(1987) (arguing that the independent counsel provisions of the Ethics in Government
Act comport with the Constitution and further the principle of checks and balances).
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counsels" (or simply defers to Congress's judgment that such a
need in fact exists), federal judges need not go to the Senate cafeteria for lunch and cigars in order to discharge this duty.
Judges participating on the Special Division could solicit wide
comment on appropriate persons for appointment as independent counsel without resorting to ex parte meetings. An open
record, containing letters from all interested parties, would permit judges to consult widely within the civic, political, and legal
communities without compromising the dignity of their office.
If direct meetings are necessary, they should be held in open
court. If senators wish to lobby the Special Division, they should
do so in the light of day, not behind closed doors." There is
nothing inherent in the consultative process that requires ex
parte meetings. Even if Judge Edwards is correct in positing
that wide consultation is a necessary incident of the exercise of
the appointments power,3 26 such consultation must occur
through a process that does not impair the ability of the members of the Special Division to go about their Article III duties.
Because it is possible for the Special Division to achieve
Congress's objectives without damaging the credibility of Article
III judges, the Special Division should structure its operation in
ways that minimize the adverse impact of judges selecting prosecutors in highly political disputes between the President and
Congress. Perhaps this view is naive and reflects a misunderstanding of the intricacies of the ways of Washington. 327 It is,
however, fundamentally consistent with the Framers' structural
protections of Article III judges and with Judge Kaufman's pru-

Certainly, the proliferation of independent counsels over the last two decades has
exacted an enormous cost-both personal and financial-on the subjects of independent counsels' investigations. See Judy Bachrach, They Who Serve and Suffer, VANITY
FAIR, Dec. 1996, at 128.

325. See the provision of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), known as the
"Government in the Sunshine Act," 5 U.S.C. § 552(b) (1994), which generally requires that the public's business be conducted in public. See H.R. REP. NO. 94-880,
pt. 1, at 3-4 (1975), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2183, 2184.
326. See Charge of Judicial Misconduct, 39 F.3d at 380.
327. See Charge of Judicial Misconduct, 39 F.3d at 382 (stating that political consultation is permissible and customary). But cf Carter, supra note 234, at 365-71
(suggesting that the consent of the people to judicial supremacy may rest on reliance
on a meaningful separation of powers).
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dential concerns about preserving the impartiality and independence of the Article III courts.ss
To the extent that Article II expressly sanctions judicial participation in the appointment of "inferior" executive branch officers,329 the exercise of delegated appointments power should
not impede the execution of core Article III duties. Because
Judge Edwards's exposition of the appointments power seems to
sanction, if not celebrate, the political aspects of the appointments power,"' Judge Edwards's view, which the full Judicial
Council affirmed, must be rejected as fundamentally inconsistent with maintaining the dignity of Article III courts.
C. Separationof Powers Doctrine and Formalism:Defending the
InstitutionalLegitimacy of Article III Courts
Formalism has had a difficult time of it in recent years. The
Supreme Court openly has embraced functionalism to the exclusion of formalism in a variety of contexts.s Moreover, many
prominent academics have rejected formalism as being too rigid

328. See Kaufmnan, supra note 302, at 696-97.
329. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
330. See Charge of Judicial Misconduct, 39 F.3d at 380-83. One should note, however, that two members of the Judicial Council rejected the argument that the exercise of Article II appointments powers may require behavior that would not be tolerated incident to the exercise of Article III judicial power. See In re Charge of Judicial Misconduct or Disability, Nos. 94-8 & 94-9, slip op. at 4-9 (D.C. Cir. Dec. 30,
1994) (Tatel & Kessler, JJ., each writing separately). Given that the Judicial Council
revisited the question of the scope of the Article H appointments power in another
case and once again endorsed Judge Edwards's reasoning regarding the scope of permissible ex parte counsultations, see In re Charge of Judicial Misconduct or Disability,. 85 F.3d 701 (D.C. Cir. Judicial Council 1996), it seems clear that Judge
Edwards's views enjoy the broad support of his colleagues-notwithstanding the concerns of Judges Tatel and Kessler.
331. See, e.g., Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361 (1989) (using a functionalist
approach to a series of separation of powers issues to sustain the legislation creating
the United States Sentencing Commission); Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654 (1988)
(upholding the independent counsel provisions of the Ethics in Government Act over
separation of powers objections, relying on functionalist reasoning to justify this result); Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833 (1986) (rejecting a
formalist argument that Article III of the Constitution requires that all state law
claims heard in a federal forum be adjudicated by Article III judges, and embracing
a functionalist approach in order to permit the Commodity Futures Trading Commission to entertain such claims).
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to accommodate the post-New Deal administrative state.3 2
For example, Professor Christopher Edley has argued quite
persuasively that "[iut is too late in the day to protest the interment of separation of powers formalism, at least in the context
of multifunction administrative agencies."33
Nevertheless, one reasonably can argue that too much of the
literature in this area of administrative law treats separation of
powers questions as implicating only executive branch/legislative
branch relations. Mistretta and Morrison demonstrate conclusively that separation of powers doctrine also must address attempts by Congress and the President to delegate non-Article
III duties to the federal courts.
It may well be the case that the modern administrative state
requires the abandonment of formalism in separation of powers
analyses, at least insofar as executive/legislative power-sharing
arrangements are concerned. 334 Both federal courts and legal
scholars need to acknowledge, however, the fundamental difference between novel power-sharing arrangements between the
two political branches and attempts to include Article III judges
in such arrangements. The former usually should be deemed
constitutionally unobjectionable, provided that none of the core
functions of the executive and/or legislative branch are transferred.335 The latter, however, cannot be countenanced-unless
332. See, e.g., EDLEY, supra note 4, at 4-7, 72-74 (arguing that "extreme deference"
to agency expertise constitutes "an abdication of judicial responsibility for the quality
of administrative government); Strauss, supra note 73, at 596-97, 639-40, 667-69
(stating that only at the apex of the political hierarchy does the separation of powers need to be maintained); Sunstein, supra note 4, at 424, 491-96 (stating that reliance on literal interpretation of the Constitution is "unhelpful" in light of historical
changes in the government); see also Stephen L. Carter, From Sick Chicken to
Synar: The Evolution and Subsequent De-Evolution of the Separation of Powers, 1987
BYU L. REV. 719, 787-811 (arguing that some separation of powers questions can
and should be resolved by the political branches themselves); Krent, supra note 4, at
1257, 1276-87 (suggesting that legislative measures that meet the bicameralism and
presentment requirements ought to be viewed with less scrutiny by the courts). But
see Redish & Cisar, supra note 4, at 453-56, 474-78 (defending the use of "pragmatic
formalism" in separation of powers analysis).
333. EDLEY, supra note 4, at 5.
334. See Sunstein, supra note 4, at 491-96.
335. See Strauss, supra note 4, at 492-96; Strauss, supra note 73, at 667-69; cf
Redish & Cisar, supra note 4, at 474-78, 486-87, 490-505 (arguing that functionalism
must be rejected in favor of a pragmatic formalist model in separation of powers

19971

MISTRETTA AND MORRISON REVISITED

477

we are prepared to devise ways of making Article III judges
more directly accountable to the citizenry.
For example, whether an administrative agency or Congress
decides if exposure to a certain substance poses a sufficient
health risk to justify a prohibition on workplace exposures is a
question that either the executive branch or the legislative
branch can answer quite competently.3 3 If Congress wishes to
delegate primary responsibility for setting particular standards
to an executive branch agency, then the federal courts should
permit Congress to delegate this legislative function to the President, to a presidentially controlled department or agency, or to
an independent commission.33 7 Regardless of whether Congress
or the President sets a particular standard, both are politically
accountable to the electorate; institutional responsibility can be
enforced.3 38
The matter should be viewed somewhat more critically when
delegations of executive or legislative power to Article III judges
are at issue. Applying a critical eye to such a situation is necessary because Article III judges are not politically accountable. 39 Article III judges cannot legitimately exercise either
executive or legislative power without answering to the people;
yet, judges' ability to engage in their Article III duties would in-

analyses).
336. See Industrial Union Dep't. v. American Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607 (1980)
(holding that Congress lawfully delegated the power to set certain worker health and
safety standards to the Occupational Health and Safety Administration (OSHA), notwithstanding the sweeping breadth of the delegation of power and meager
congressional limitations on OSHA's exercise of it).

337. See id.
338. Of course, formalists would (and do) insist that Congress, and Congress alone, can
exercise legislative power. See id. at 671, 672-76, 685-88 (Rehnquist, J., concurring).
339. Perennial Republican presidential candidate Pat Buchanan has suggested that
the decisions of the federal courts should be subject to popular referenda. See Antho-

ny Lewis, Voice of America?, N.Y. TIMS, Feb. 26, 1996, at A13. This device would,
of course, make Article III courts politically accountable. That said, it would be difficult to imagine a proposal that would undermine the rule of law more effectively
than does Mr. Buchanan's novel idea. The rule of law is a function of our independent judiciary, strip the judiciary of its independence, and the concept of the rule of
law is left naked in the cold. See WILLIAM VAN AIsTYNE, INTERPRETATIONS OF THE

FIRST AMENDMENT 3-19 (1984) (providing historical background of the Constitution
and arguing for both fealty to text and the Supreme Court's prior interpretations of
the text).
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evitably suffer if they were made to answer to the people.
Another approach posits that individual judges could carefully
divide and compartmentalize their judicial and extrajudicial responsibilities. This proposed solution also fails: Even if Article
III judges could possibly compartmentalize their various judicial
and nonjudicial duties--carefully separating one task and one
mind-set from another-it is highly doubtful that the citizenry
ever would embrace this empty dualism.3 4 °
Unlike Congress or the President, the institutional legitimacy
of the Article III courts rests on the apolitical nature of those
courts.5 4 ' The decisions of the federal courts, particularly those
of constitutional dimension, have the ability to command the
public's loyalty and obedience precisely because the decisions are
usually thought to be above politics; the Supreme Court speaks

340. Judge Edwards's attempt to distinguish Article III and non-Article III duties
did not persuade even distinguished members of the bar; it seems doubtful that it
would be materially more persuasive to members of the lay public, notwithstanding
the fact that his colleagues on the D.C. Circuit Judicial Council embraced this reasoning. See Judges Err on Whitewater, supra note 14, at A26; Locy, supra note 206,
at A9; Schmidt, supra note 14, at A9; see also Carter, supra note 234, at 366-72
(discussing judicial and popular views of the structural clauses of the Constitution).
341. This state of affairs also makes it virtually impossible for legislative or executive branch personnel to exercise Article III judicial power legitimately. Suppose
that the federal courts attempted to delegate to Congress or the President the obligation to decide Article III "cases or controversies." Would decisions from either of
the political branches achieve broad public acceptance? I suggest that they would
not, largely because decisions emanating from either political branch of government
will be assumed to reflect and incorporate partisan interest as much as dispassionate reason. See generally VAN ALSTYNE, supra note 339, at 11-13 (explaining why
the role of judicial review is both antidemocratic and fundamentally fair, if one
takes seriously the supremacy of the Constitution). The public accepts the legitimacy
of administrative adjudications and licensing proceedings-which essentially are quasi-judicial proceedings undertaken by executive branch personnel-only because the
APA provides significant procedural safeguards to the litigants, notably including
provisions that provide for impartial decision-making personnel (i.e., ALJs). See Federal Administrative Procedure Act of 1946, 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-559, 701-706 (1994). Furthermore, the public's confidence in such proceedings is fortified considerably by APA
provisions that ensure the availability of broad judicial review of administrative adjudications by Article III judges. See id. §§ 701-706. Conversely, the public does not
(indeed cannot) maintain much confidence in the independence and impartiality of
judges selected through partisan elections-a manner of selection that apparently
results in sitting judges actively soliciting campaign contributions from lawyers who
regularly appear before their bench. See Peter Applebome, Texas Court Fight Puts
Focus on Elected Judges, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 22, 1988, at B4; Saundra Torry, Study
Cites Lawyers' Campaign Contributions, WASH. POST, Sept. 13, 1994, at D3.
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to enduring constitutional values, not to the latest polling data. 2 Power-sharing arrangements that require judicial personnel to participate actively in political life are certain to cause the
public to experience cognitive dissonance. Both citizens and the
press undoubtedly will question how an Article III judge's work
product plausibly can be deemed nonpolitical if the judge writing
the opinion is a blatantly political agent.
Fuzzy balancing tests of the sort used in Mistretta and Morrison inevitably will result in judges venturing into places where
they do not belong and undertaking roles for which they are institutionally ill suited. In such cases, the federal courts must resolve to protect their institutional interests against attempts by
the President or Congress to contract or expand the federal
judiciary's duties.
Unlike the federal courts, both the President and Congress
have ample tools at their disposal to prevent encroachments on
their institutional prerogatives and attempts to fob off tasks that
belong more properly to another coordinate branch. Moreover,
executive and legislative roles are both thoroughly political;
undertaking partisan or policy-oriented tasks harms neither the
President nor Congress. Accordingly, one could argue that there
is little need for the Supreme Court to play umpire between the
two political branches. 4 3
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court's decisions in Bowsher v.
3 4 5 incorporate
a formalist
Synar3 " and INS v. Chadha
conception of the separation of "legislative" and "executive" functions, striking down (respectively) legislative oversight of the

342. See generally ACKEP AN, supra note 181, at 261-65 (suggesting that the Court
has done a good job of interpreting the constitutional principles set forth by the
Framers). But cf United States v. Bayless, 921 F. Supp. 211 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (involving a search and seizure rehearing after substantial political and public outrage resulted over the initial decision).
343. See Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 177 (1926) (Holmes, J., dissenting);
see also JESSE H. CHOPER, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE NATIONAL POLITICAL PROCESS:
A FUNCTIONAL RECONSIDERATION OF THE ROLE OF THE SUPREME COURT 275 (1980)
(arguing that interbranch conflict restrains each branch from overstepping its bound-

aries). For a critical rejoinder to this argument, see Redish & Cisar, supra note 4,
at 491-94.
344. 478 U.S. 714 (1986).
345. 462 U.S. 919 (1983).
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execution of the budget34 6 and the legislative veto.1 7 It is

more than a little ironic that the Supreme Court has deployed
formalist reasoning to strike down novel power-sharing arrangements between Congress and the President, 4 ' but has relied
on functional reasoning to permit the transfer of legislative and
executive duties to Article III personnel. 49 The Court has it
precisely backwards: provided that essentially political duties
remain vested within a political branch of government, accountability is not lost; voters can assess blame or credit as the circumstances warrant.35 Conversely, when legislative or executive functions end up in the hands of federal judges, the citizenry is left without effective recourse.
Not only has the Supreme Court's separation of powers jurisprudence failed to draw a clear distinction between delegations
involving the political branches and delegations involving the
judicial branch, but, on occasion, it even has embraced a looser
form of functionalism when analyzing the delegation of judicial
duties to executive branch institutions. For example, in Commodity Futures Trading Corp. v. Schor,51 the Supreme Court
embraced an exceedingly amorphous balancing test to determine
346. See Bowsher, 478 U.S. at 732-34.
347. See Chadha, 462 U.S. at 944-59.
348. See Bowsher, 478 U.S. 714; Chadha, 462 U.S. 919.
349. See Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361 (1989); Morrison v. Olson, 487
U.S. 654 (1988); supra Parts IA, II.A.
350. Moreover, the separation of powers difficulties at issue in Bowsher and
Chadha could have been resolved through unilateral self-help by the President. This
claim is a rather bold one, a claim that requires some proof. Most obviously, in both
instances, the President could veto the offensive legislation; in both Bowsher and
Chadha, however, the President elected not to interpose a veto. One could respond
reasonably that a sitting President should not be permitted to bind forever his (or
her) successors. Some further suggestions therefore are in order. In the case of
Bowsher, the President simply could have vetoed bills containing spending authorizations in excess of the Gramm-Rudman targets or, in the alternative, ordered reces
sions prior to the preparation of mandatory recessions by the Comptroller General.
See Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974, 2 U.S.C. §§ 681688 (1994); cf Kennedy v. Mathews, 413 F. Supp. 1240, 1245 (D.D.C. 1976) (requiring the executive branch to spend all appropriated funds for a legislative program
absent express congressional authorization to do otherwise). With respect to Chadha,
the President simply could have elected not to prosecute or to deport an alien whose
refugee status Congress, strictly speaking, "vetoed;" the legislative veto at issue in
Chadha would not have required the President to deport anyone.
351. 478 U.S. 833 (1986).
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whether Congress could delegate to the Commodity Futures
Trading Commission the power to decide state law counterclaims (subject to an appeal heard by an Article III court):
[in reviewing Article III challenges, we have weighed a number of factors, none of which has been deemed determinative,
with an eye to the practical effect that the congressional action will have on the constitutionally assigned role of the federal judiciary.... Among the factors upon which we have
focused are the extent to which the "essential attributes of
judicial power" are reserved to Article III courts, and, conversely, the extent to which the non-Article III forum exercises the range of jurisdiction and powers normally vested
only in Article III courts, the origins and importance of the
right to be adjudicated, and the concerns that drove Congress
to depart from the requirements of Article II.52
This loose sort of balancing test insufficiently protects the Article III courts, and fails to appreciate the virtues associated with
providing litigants with Article III decisionmakers. Northern
Pipeline Construction Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., a decision
cast in formalist terms, provided a much better benchmark for
assessing the propriety of delegating Article III tasks to
non-Article III personnel.3 53
Although the Supreme Court is perfectly entitled to continue
refereeing interbranch disputes between the President and Congress, it should articulate and apply consistently a stricter standard of review to interbranch power-sharing arrangements that
either expand or contract the duties of Article III courts or their
personnel. Formalism, or some form of neo-Formalism, is necessary to protect the judiciary from attempts to shift duties that
352. Id. at 851 (citations omitted); cf Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon
Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 58-59 (1982) ("The inexorable command of [Article III] is
clear and definite: The judicial power of the United States must be exercised by
courts having attributes prescribed in Art. III.").
353. See Marathon, 458 U.S. at 57-63, 73-74. Marathon remains good law, notwithstanding the Court's functionalist analytical backsliding in Schor. See Granfinanciera,
S.A. v. Nordberg, 492 U.S. 33, 52-56 (1989) (applying Marathon and stating that
Congress can assign only "public rights" violations to non-Article III courts); Coit
Indep. Joint Venture v. FSLIC, 489 U.S. 561, 578-79 (1989) (citing and applying
Marathon).
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will require Article III judges to be held publicly accountable for
their decisions. Drafting sentencing guidelines and appointing
prosecutors are duties that usually, if not always, will require
some form of political accountability. Accordingly, they should
not be undertaken by Article III judges in the absence of strong
measures to protect the independence-the nonaccountabilityof Article III judges.
Several commentators have argued that the Supreme Court
wrongly decided Mistretta and Morrison on separation of powers
grounds. 54 Prohibiting these sorts of delegations completely is
certainly preferable to the current state of affairs. Having stumbled upon the merely good, one should not abandon the quest for
the best. A theory of the separation of powers that prohibits absolutely the delegations at issue in Mistretta and Morrison exaggerates the scope of the difficulties associated with interbranch
delegations involving the judicial branch and underestimates the
ability of the courts to cure these difficulties through procedural
protections that restrict the ability of federal judges to execute
delegated functions in political ways.
Although the Supreme Court failed to appreciate fully the inherent dangers of permitting Article III judges to undertake legislative355 or executive35 duties, such service should not be

354. See, e.g., Carter, supra note 234, at 358-64; Murchison, supra note 170, at
1035-39; Redish & Cisar, supra note 4, at 490; Wright, supra note 26, at 30-34; Jordan Fried, Note, The Constitutionality of the U.S. Sentencing Commission: An Analysis of the Role of the Judiciary, 57 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 704, 727-30 (1989); Kristin
L. Timm, Note, "The Judge Would Then Be the Legislator": Dismantling Separation
of Powers in the Name of Sentencing Reform, 65 WASH. L. REV. 249, 263-65 (1990).
355. See Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 371-79 (1989). Determining appropriate punishments is quintessentially a legislative task. Indeed, federal executive
agencies generally are prohibited from creating criminal punishments incident to their
delegated authority. See In re Kollock, 165 U.S. 526 (1897) (permitting the Commissioner of Internal Revenue to define particular marks and brands that violated legislative statutes but noting that the Commissioner could not create administrative
crimes out of whole cloth); United States v. Eaten, 144 U.S. 677, 687-88 (1892) (prohibiting the Secretary of the Treasury from making the failure to keep oleomargarine
records punishable by law in the absence of a clear legislative command requiring
the keeping of such records); see also Mark D. Alexander, Note, Increased Judicial
Scrutiny for the Administrative Crime, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 612 (1992) (discussing the
history of administrative agencies' attempts to expand criminal liability for violations
of regulations). Judges do retain substantial "legislative" authority under the common
law; in most states the local Supreme Court is free to determine the substantive
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deemed constitutionally impermissible in all circumstances. Provided that the federal courts demand adequate procedural safeguards to preserve the independence and impartiality of Article
III judges, Congress should not be barred absolutely from placing Article III judges in roles traditionally associated with the
legislative and executive branches of government. 57
Make no mistake, however: more than a modicum of pragmatism is needed in deciding cases like Mistretta and Morrison. To
the extent that functionalism purports to be a pragmatic approach to separation of powers issues, federal courts also must
be realistic about the effects, real and perceived, of augmenting
the duties of Article III judges with essentially legislative or executive tasks."5 ' The alternative-acquiescence in the transforcontent of the law of torts, property, and contract, subject to the acquiescence of the
legislature. See STATE SUPREME COURTS: POLICYMAKERS IN THE FEDERAL SYSTEM
(Mary Comelia Porter & G. Alan Tarr eds., 1982); Craig E. Emmert & Carol Ann
Traut, State Supreme Courts, State Constitutions, and Judicial Policymaking, 16
JUST. SYS. J. 37 (1992); see also Mark C. Miller, A Legal Perspective on the Ohio,
Massachusetts, and Federal Courts, 56 OHIO ST. L.J. 235, 240-57 (1995) (comparing
federal and state courts and their respective policy-making influences).
356. See Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 688-99 (1988). The appointment of prosecutors is an executive function. Just as the President enjoys the power to appoint
cabinet officers, military officers, ambassadors, and federal judges, subject in some
cases to the advice and consent of the Senate, see U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2, the
President possesses the authority to appoint federal prosecutors. Furthermore, the
prosecution of crimes is an executive function. See Morrison, 487 U.S. at 706 (Scalia,
J., dissenting); Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 832 (1985); Calabresi, supra note
325, at 90-95. But cf Lessig & Sunstein, supra note 324, at 14-22 (arguing that the
Framers did not place prosecution within the exclusive domain of the President);
Levin, supra note 324, at 14-17 (stating that independent counsel should seek to
promote public confidence in government).
357. In some cases, however, no amount of procedural safeguards would suffice to
avoid compromising the independence and impartiality of Article III courts. Suppose
Congress attempted to delegate the power to declare war to a special panel of federal judges. Upon a petition from a member of Congress, these judges would determine whether a particular presidential deployment of troops required as a prerequisite a congressional declaration of war. Such an arrangement would require judges
to make purely political decisions and would put judicial personnel at the heart of a
classic interbranch dispute between the President and Congress-not as judges, but
rather as public policy mavens. Under no circumstances could such a scheme be
countenanced; indeed, even a hard-core functionalist would be hard-pressed to defend
such a novel approach to interbranch power sharing.
358. Moreover, from a practical perspective, it seems doubtful that the Supreme
Court will abandon its functionalist jurisprudence anytime soon. See Public Citizen v.
United States Dep't of Justice, 491 U.S. 440 (1989) (applying functionalist reasoning
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mation of federal judges into political actors-would destroy the
credibility of Article III courts."' Thus, an intellectually defensible functionalist conception of the separation of powers must
incorporate some formalism in its approach to delegations to and
from Article III courts.
A proper balance could be struck by relying on a form of softcore formalism when evaluating attempts by Congress and the
President to delegate executive or legislative tasks to the federal
judiciary. To borrow a phrase coined by Professor Martin Redish,
this must be a "pragmatic formalism"3 6 -- in this case, a kind of
formalism that views with greater skepticism attempts by either
Congress or the President to draw the judiciary into essentially
political matters. Congress and the President should be held to a
higher standard of justification when delegations of political
power to and delegations of judicial power from Article III courts
and their personnel are at issue. 5 '
The Supreme Court already has established that it will jealously protect the constitutional obligation of Article III courts to
decide cases and controversies arising at law.362 A corollary of
this principle must be that the federal judiciary generally should
not undertake duties that would, of necessity, require it to be
directly involved in policy decisions of a legislative or executive
nature. Derogations from this principle, such as the delegations
at issue in Mistretta and Morrison, should be permitted only if
the exercise of the delegated powers can be depoliticized through
the adoption of process-based protections.

to conclude that the president may consult with a committee of the ABA regarding
potential judicial nominees); cf Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 115 S. Ct. 1447
(1995) (relying upon more formalist reasoning to vacate SEC regulations that purported to require the reopening of certain final judicial actions because the SEC regulations violated the separation of powers doctrine); Freytag v. Commissioner, 501
U.S. 868 (1991) (parsing carefully the text of the Constitution's Appointments Clause
to determine whether the Chief Judge of the United States Tax Court, an Article I
tribunal, could appoint magistrate-like "special judges").
359. In fact, the loose functionalism of Mistretta and Morrison already has caused
nontrivial damage to the reputation of Article III courts.
360. Redish & Cisar, supra note 4, at 452-56.
361. See generally Kaufman, supra note 302, at 688-97 (discussing the independence
of the three branches).
362. See Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50 (1982).

19971

MISTRETTA AND MORRISON REVISITED

485

V. CONCLUSION

Hindsight is 20/20: The Supreme Court failed to establish sufficient safeguards in Mistretta and Morrison to protect the federal judiciary from untoward entanglements with the executive
and legislative branches of government. Judge J. Skelley Wright
once observed that "public confidence in the judiciary is indispensable to the operation of the law; yet this quality is placed in
risk whenever judges step outside the courtroom into the vortex
of political activity."3" Accordingly, "Ijiudges should be saved
'from the entanglements, at times the partisan suspicions, so often the result of other and conflicting duties."' '
As implemented in the lower federal courts, Mistretta and
Morrison create a nontrivial risk of entangling the judiciary in
matters likely to arouse "partisan suspicions," thereby detracting
from the effectiveness of Article III judges as a class. Mistretta
and Morrison therefore must be reconstructed to provide a stronger bulwark against the appearance of partisanship, and to
maintain the independence and integrity of Article III courts. If
some judges are to wear two hats, their executive (or legislative)
garb must not leave them ill-suited in the public's eye to return
to the plainer, basic black that is the essence of the Article III
judge's wardrobe.

363. Hobson v. Hansen, 265 F. Supp. 902, 923 (D.D.C. 1967) (Wright, J., dissenting).
364. Id. (Wright, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).

